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Executive Summary 
The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) is to transform the current US air 
transportation system in order to increase its capacity, efficiency, and reliability, as well as 
minimize its environmental impact. NextGen is a complex socio-technical system and, in many 
ways, it is expected to be more complex than the current system. While many NextGen 
elements (technologies, systems, and procedures) may increase safety, the expected increase 
in complexity may, under certain circumstances (e.g., automation failures), complicate safety 
situations. Yet, according to the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), NextGen must 
be safer than today’s system in managing the projected growth in air traffic volume. Therefore, it 
is vital to assess the safety impact of the NextGen elements in a rigorous and systematic way 
and to ensure that they do not compromise safety.  
 
We first surveyed a number of major NextGen documents and databases including the 
JPDO Enterprise Architecture for the NextGen, JPDO NextGen Integrated Work Plan, the FAA 
NAS Enterprise Architecture, and the FAA NextGen Implementation Plan. We identified all of 
the NextGen elements in the form of Operational Improvements (OIs), Enablers, Research and 
Development (R&D) Activities, and Policy Issues.  
 
Next, we outlined the overall hazard situation in NextGen. Several features of NextGen may 
contribute to the challenging hazard situation, including higher traffic density, higher levels of 
automation, more tightly-coupled operations, decentralized operations, and introduction of 
multiple elements within a short time. Following that, we performed a high-level hazard analysis 
associated with multiple elements in a particular OI known as OI-0349 (Automation Support for 
Separation Management), using our Socio-Technical Framework of Hazard Identification. 
Hazards were identified from the following factors and their interactions: humans, machines 
(both hardware and software), environment, as well as organizational factors and factors 
outside organizations. This was followed by a high-level analysis of hazards in a Fight Deck 
Interval Management for Spacing (FIM-S) scenario, which is part of the same OI. We illustrated 
how hazards can result from the highly dynamic complexity involved in that NextGen scenario, a 
situation that is not experienced in the current system. 
 
Then we reviewed a selected but representative set of the existing safety methods, tools, 
processes, and regulations and analyzed whether they are sufficient to assess safety in the 
elements of that OI and ensure that safety will not be compromised. The results indicate the 
following: 
 
• Overall, the existing methods and tools used in the United States do not appear to be 
sufficient because they do not allow full consideration of the dynamic complexity. 
• The existing processes for safety certification and approval in this country are mostly not 
sufficient because they are conducted for individual components (e.g., aircraft and its 
systems, ground facilities, and air traffic procedures) separately, but not for the whole 
system associated with an OI.  
• Similarly, corresponding regulations are not sufficient because they are imposed for the 
safety of individual components only, but not for the system of the relevant OI. 
 
We also assessed the costs of the methods, tools, processes and regulations. The 
inadequate methods, tools, processes, and regulations might incur intolerably high costs in the 
long term, including costs of not meeting the required NextGen safety level. On the other hand, 
an adequate approach can also be costly because of the time and resources required for the 
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development and validation. However, the costs of an adequate approach should be weighed 
against the costs of an inadequate approach. 
  
Based on the assessments, we make several recommendations, which we believe may lead 
to improvements. Specifically, there is a need for continuous innovation, including the 
development of new methods and tools, and improvement of the safety processes and 
regulations. An important part of this effort would be a more systematic review and assessment 
of the methods, tools, processes, and regulations associated with safety of Single European 
Sky ATM Research (SESAR). Some of the approaches and practices for SESAR safety could 
be adopted for ensuring NextGen safety as they face similar safety challenges.  
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1. Introduction 
The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) is to transform the current US air 
transportation system in order to increase its capacity, efficiency, and reliability, as well as 
minimize its environmental impact. NextGen is a complex socio-technical system and, in many 
ways, it is expected to be more complex than the current system. While many NextGen 
elements (technologies, systems, and procedures) may increase safety, the expected increase 
in complexity may, under certain circumstances (e.g., automation failures), complicate the 
safety situation. Yet, according to the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO), NextGen 
must be safer than today’s system in managing the projected growth in air traffic volume [1]. 
Therefore, it is vital to assess the safety impact of the NextGen elements in a rigorous and 
systematic way and to ensure that they do not compromise safety.  
 
The scope of this work is to evaluate the hazards that are likely to arise during the 
implementation and deployment of NextGen systems, and assess whether existing safety 
methods, tools, processes, and regulations are sufficient to address adequately each issue or 
hazard. A hazard may be said to be “addressed adequately” if 1) a suitably high degree of 
confidence can be justifiably obtained that the issue or hazard will not result in a decrease in the 
safety of air transportation, and 2) the cost of obtaining the requisite degree of confidence is 
tolerable. 
 
The objective of this work is to 1) identify proposed and planned NextGen elements 
(technologies, systems, and procedures), 2) assess their safety implications (for a number of 
these elements, this assessment includes a high-level hazard analysis that takes into 
consideration potential hardware, software, human, environmental, organizational, and other 
factors), 3) assess a selected but representative set of the existing tools, methods, procedures, 
and regulations in terms of whether they are sufficient to ensure that the current level of safety 
is not compromised, and whether they might incur intolerably high costs. 
 
 
2. Identification of Planned and Proposed NextGen Technologies, 
Systems, and Procedures 
In this section, we first outline the NextGen documents and databases we surveyed, 
followed by the identification of the NextGen elements, and the relationship among the elements 
found in various documents and databases.  
2.1. NextGen Documents and Databases Surveyed 
In order to identify the planned and proposed NextGen technologies, systems, and 
procedures, we surveyed a large number of NextGen documents and databases. Below are 
some examples: 
 
• The JPDO Enterprise Architecture (EA) [2]  
• The JPDO Integrated Work Plan (IWP) [3] 
• Other JPDO documents such as NextGen Concept of Operations [1], Targeted NextGen 
Capabilities for 2025 [4], Net-Centric Operations Concept of Operations [5], and JPDO 
Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO) Study Team Report [6] 
• The FAA National Airspace System Enterprise Architecture (NAS EA) [7] 
• The FAA NextGen Implementation Plan (NGIP) 2012 [8] 
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• Other FAA documents such as the AVS Work Plan for NextGen 2012 [9], FAA 2009-
2013 Flight Plan [10], 2011 National Aviation Research Plan [11], and National Airspace 
and Procedure Plan 2010 [12] 
 
FAA AVS Work Plan for NextGen 2011 [9] summarizes the following four major NextGen 
documents and databases, which contain most of the JPDO and FAA planning elements 
activities: 
 
• The JPDO EA is “the blueprint for NextGen…describes the segments, capabilities, 
operational activities, and identified relationships to the key target components of 
NextGen in the year 2025…The key difference between the JPDO EA and the FAA’s 
NAS Enterprise Architecture is the JPDO EA has a broader scope and looks at the entire 
air transportation system, including operations and systems beyond the responsibilities 
of the FAA” [9, p. 27]. 
• The JPDO IWP “supports the collaborative planning and deliberation among partners 
and stakeholders to prioritize needs, establish commitments, coordinate efforts, and 
focus resources on the work needed to achieve NextGen. The IWP provides 
comprehensive information about the elemental operational improvements, enablers, 
development and research milestones, and policies that define the overall NextGen 
plan) [9, p. 29]. 
• The FAA NAS EA “aims to provide accurate and concise architecture information for 
NAS enterprise-level decision making. The NAS EA includes a comprehensive set of 
Operational Improvements (OIs)…also includes operational depictions and technology 
roadmaps of the FAA’s plans” [9, p. 29].  
• FAA NGIP “provides an overview of the FAA’s ongoing transition to NextGen. The NGIP 
addresses results of the previous year’s activities as well as the FAA’s current and mid-
term commitments (2012-2018)” [9, p. 29]. 
 
Another major difference between the JPDO and the FAA planning is in look-ahead time. 
According to the FAA AVS Work Plan for NextGen 2011, “JPDO develops the overall vision and 
far-term plan while FAA plans and implements the majority of NextGen’s near-term (current 
through 2012) and mid-term (2012 through 2018) goals” [13, p. 27]. 
2.2. NextGen Elements 
The JPDO IWP, the FAA NAS EA, and the FAA NGIP contain most (if not all) the NextGen 
elements. Within the JPDO IWP, there are five planning element types (see Figure 1, [14, p. 11] 
for the relationship among the element types): 
 
• “Operational Improvement (OI): An OI describes the operational changes needed to 
achieve the concepts and capabilities identified in the ConOps and EA. It describes a 
specific stage in the transformation and the performance improvements expected at that 
point in time…  
• Enabler: An Enabler describes a specific functional component needed to support one or 
more OIs or other Enablers. Enablers describe both materiel components such as 
communication, navigation, and surveillance systems; and non-materiel components 
such as procedures, algorithms, and standards… 
• Development Activity: Development Activities describe development initiatives or 
demonstrations and the results and/or outputs needed to support other NextGen 
planning elements…  
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• Research Activity: Research Activities describe basic or applied research initiatives and 
the results and/or outputs needed to support other NextGen planning elements… 
• Policy Issue: Many of the OIs and Enablers require policy changes to support their 
realization, particularly related to interoperability, standardization, and governance…” 
[15, pp. 2-3]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. NextGen Elements 
 
The FAA NAS EA contains several products: 
 
• Service Roadmaps  
• Operational Improvements 
• Infrastructure Roadmaps 
• Financial 
• Architecture  
• Requirements 
 
The FAA NGIP, among other elements, also describes OIs, Supporting Common Services, 
Enablers, and the associated (FAA) Policies.  
 
Based on the review of those documents and databases, we consider those elements in the 
IWP, NGIP, and NAS EA frameworks as the planned and proposed NextGen technologies, 
11 
systems, and procedures. This is justifiable because the technologies, systems, and procedures 
are either part of or embedded in those elements. The NextGen elements in the IWP (i.e., OIs, 
Enablers, Development Activities, Research Activities, and Policy Issues) can be found at the 
JPDO Joint Planning Environment (JPE) website (http://jpe.jpdo.gov/ee/request/page?id=1415). 
The FAA NAS EA products, including the OIs, can be found at FAA’s NAS EA Portal 
(https://nasea.faa.gov/). The OIs, Supporting Common Services, Enablers, and the associated 
(FAA) Policies in the FAA NGIP can be found at its website 
(http://www.faa.gov/nextgen/implementation/plan/).   
 
Figure 2 shows the relationship among the NextGen OIs in the various documents and 
databases. All of the OIs in the FAA NGIP are part of the FAA NAS EA OIs, which partly overlap 
with those in the JPDO’s IWP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Relationship among NextGen OIs in IWP, NAS EA, and NGIP 
 
 
3. Assessment of Safety Hazards 
A hazard is defined by the FAA as a "condition, event, or circumstance that could lead to or 
contribute to an unplanned or undesired event" [16, p. 3- 4]. “Seldom does a single hazard 
cause an accident. More often, an accident occurs as the result of a sequence of causes termed 
initiating and contributory hazards” [16, p. 3- 4]. According to the FAA System Safety Handbook, 
there are hazards and contributory hazards (see Figure 3 [16, p. 3- 4]). Hence, unless otherwise 
noted, hazards will refer to a generic term, which includes both “hazards” and “contributory 
hazards.”  
 
 
 
 
 
NGIP 
IWP
NAS EA
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Figure 3. Accident Scenario Model 
 
Hazard identification is an important part of safety risk management (SRM), which is 
required to be applied to any changes to the NAS, including the NextGen elements, to eliminate 
the risks or manage the risks below or at an acceptable level. As Figure 4 [17, p. 26] shows, 
hazard identification (along with the system description) is the prerequisite for other phases of 
the SRM process: risk analysis, assessment, and treatment [17], [18]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Typical Safety Risk Management Phases  
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The contemporary safety approach requires that hazards be identified from the multiple 
factors and components of a system and their interactions [17], [18], [19]. That is, hazards 
should be identified from liveware (i.e., human), hardware, software, and environmental factors 
and their interactions [20]. It is also critical to identify hazards from organizational factors and 
factors outside organizations [21].  
 
In this section, we first outline the overall NextGen hazard situation. Next, we provide an 
analysis of hazards involved in OI-0349, which is then followed by an analysis of hazards 
involved in an OI-0349 scenario. The analysis in this section is a high-level analysis that 
represents only hazards resulting from a subset of all the possible factors and their interactions. 
A full-scale analysis that considers all the factors and all the interactions is beyond the scope of 
the current work.   
3.1. Overall NextGen Hazard Situation 
The air transportation system is a complex socio-technical system. Socio-technical systems 
are “systems in which people must actively and closely interact with technology to achieve 
production goals through delivery of services ...” [18, p. 4-1]. The air transportation system may 
also be thought of as a system of systems (SoS) and has the following characteristics, all of 
which contribute to hazards and risks [22]: 
 
• Emergent properties 
• Autonomous operations 
• Interconnected constituents 
• Ambiguous/changing boundaries 
• Multiple contexts and influences 
• Dynamic stakeholder relationships 
 
The hazard situation in NextGen is, in many ways, more challenging than the current system 
for the following reasons: 
 
• Higher traffic density than in the current system [1] 
• Increased use of automation and automation at higher levels than in the current system 
[1]  
• Operations that are more tightly coupled than in the current system [1], [23], [24], [25], 
[26] 
• Decentralized operations vs. centralized operations in the current system [1], [26] 
• Multiple new elements being or to be introduced simultaneously or within a shorter time 
than previously, making safety assessment and assurance a tremendous challenge [27]. 
 
All these features may contribute to increased complexity in NextGen, especially increase in 
dynamic complexity. Dynamic complexity refers to the “situations where cause and effect are 
subtle, and where the effects over time of interventions are not obvious” [28, p. 71]. Dynamic 
complexity is different from detail complexity. A system that simply contains a large number of 
components may have a large degree of detail complexity, but it is not necessarily dynamically 
complex, if the cause-effect relationship is straightforward and thus is easy to understand. In 
complex socio-technical systems such as the air transportation system, dynamic complexity 
results from the attributes of multiple factors or components in the system as well as their 
interactions. From the control-theoretical point of view [29], [30], the more complex a system is, 
the more unknowns there are in it, and thus the more difficult it is to understand how control 
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constraints (e.g., aircraft are not allowed to be closer to each other than the prescribed 
separation minima) might be violated and ultimately ensure they are not violated.  
 
More specifically, a number of key factors in NextGen contribute to the increased complexity 
and thus present unique hazards to the safety: 
 
• Machine factors—Compared to the current system, NextGen is a more software-
intensive system [31] and such systems present unique safety challenges relative to 
hardware-intensive systems [30]. The complexity of software increases as the 
complexity of new avionic systems increases. Hardware reliability is also a concern [32]. 
As mentioned above, another critical machine factor is the more extensive use of 
automation at higher levels than today.  
• Human factors—Among other human factors concerns are those associated with 
changes in automation. For example, there are four stages of automation in air traffic 
control (ATC): 1) information acquisition (such as display of aircraft position on radar 
screen for air traffic controllers), 2) information analysis (such as prediction of conflict 
between aircraft by computer), 3) decision selection (such as recommendation of conflict 
resolution by computer), and 4) action implementation (such as implementation of the 
recommended resolution by computer) (see Figure 5 [33]). Figure 5 also shows that the 
automation level in future systems will be higher at all the four stages than in the current 
systems, in particular at the two latter stages (decision selection and action 
implementation). Changes in automation will inevitably result in role changes for the 
operational personnel. The changed roles may significantly alter their workload and 
situation awareness, and lead to new types of human errors. 
• Environmental factors—In particular, weather predictability issues may have hazardous 
impacts especially on Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO). TBO is reliant on the 
predictability of weather, and the uncertainty of the weather shortens the time horizon of 
predictability. This has implications for safety. For example, aircraft could be closer than 
they should be because of the incorrect weather prediction. 
• Organizational and factors beyond organizations—R&D efforts to support the 
implementation of NextGen capabilities are complex [27]. This complexity may 
potentially impact the safety level of NextGen. Issues and gaps in safety-related 
methods, processes, regulations, including rules and standards, are numerous, a topic 
that will be further discussed in section 4 of this document. Other safety-related factors 
include global interoperability issues [34], [35], availability of budget to support the 
development and implementation of NextGen elements [36], and lack of qualified air 
traffic controllers at critical ATC facilities [37]. 
 
To a certain extent, the above outline of the unique features of the multiple factors (human, 
machine, environmental, organizational, and other factors) has implied their possible 
interactions. Section 3.2 describes the results of a high-level hazard analysis for a NextGen OI. 
While all the features outlined above are applicable to that OI, section 3.2 describes in more 
detail the interactions among the multiple factors involved in that OI. 
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Figure 5. Today and Future Automation Levels of ATC Systems 
(@ 2000 IEEE. Derivation of original figure used with permission, from Figure 2 in [33, p. 288]). 
3.2. Hazards in OI-0349 (Automation Support for Separation Management) 
Our criterion for choosing a NextGen OI for the hazard analysis is that it, along with its 
constituent elements, should be representative of NextGen operations. We chose OI-0349 
(Automation Support for Separation Management) to perform a high-level hazard analysis 
because it includes the key features of NextGen: high-level automation, tightly-coupled and 
decentralized operations, dynamic complexity, high traffic density, and many new elements to 
be introduced within a short time. OI-0349 is described by the JPDO IWP as follows:   
 
The ANSP automation provides the controller with tools to manage aircraft separation in a  
mixed navigation and wake performance environment. Aircraft with various operating and  
performance characteristics will be operating within the same volume of airspace.  
Controllers will use ANSP automation enhancements to provide situational awareness of  
aircraft with differing performance capabilities (e.g., delegated self-separation maneuvers,  
equipped vs. non-equipped aircraft, RNAV, RNP, and trajectory flight data management).  
For example in performance-based navigation, RNAV/RNP routes may be spaced closer  
than the normally required separation for the sector area. The standard system conflict alert  
and conflict probe for the designated area account for this reduced spacing. These  
enhancements enable ANSP to manage the anticipated increase in complexity and volume  
of air traffic. [3, http://jpe.jpdo.gov/ee/request/elementForm?id=1020209]. 
 
Our Socio-Technical Framework of Hazard Analysis [35] was used to guide the analysis, 
because it takes into consideration potential hardware, software, human, and environmental 
factors, as well as influences from organizational factors and factors beyond organizations 
(see Figure 6, adapted from Figure 4 in [35, p. 8B4-7].  
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Figure 6. Major Components in the Socio-Technical Framework of Hazard Identification 
 
Because OI-0349 is still in the concept phase, the hazard analysis is basically a preliminary 
hazard analysis [35], [38]. This early hazard analysis is in alignment with JPDO’s position, “The 
incorporation of safety risk management into concept planning activities is consistent with the 
National Safety Management System (SMS) standard developed by the Safety Working Group 
(WG)” [39, p. 3]. 
 
An important question concerns the relationship among hazards already existing in the 
current system and new hazards that may arise in NextGen. That is, should we only examine 
hazards unique to the NextGen elements (OIs, Enablers, Development Activities, Research 
Activities, and Policy Issues)? Or should we also examine the hazards associated with the 
remaining elements of the current system? In this study, we included some hazards that are 
common to both the current system and NextGen (e.g., weather). Further, a latent hazard 
suppressed in the current system could manifest itself when interacting with the new (NextGen) 
elements [21]. A major source of latent hazards is mixed equipage. In this study, we also 
included some examples of how hazards can emerge as a result of interactions among some 
equipment that exists in the current system and will remain in NextGen and some new 
equipment in NextGen. Figure 7 (adapted from Figure 5 in [35, p. 8B4-8]) schematically shows 
the relationship among hazards in the current system and those in the NextGen.  
 
 
 
Human
Machine Environment
Organizational Factors 
(e.g., Supervision, Safety Culture, and 
Resource Management) 
Factors outside Organizations 
(e.g., Policies, Regulations, and Standards)   
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Figure 7. Schematic Relationship among Hazards in the Current System and NextGen. 
 
The steps we undertook in the hazard analysis are described below in chronological order: 
 
• Step 1. The description of the OI was extracted from a JPDO IWP 
website  http://jpe.jpdo.gov/ee/request/elementForm?id=1020209. 
• Step 2. The timetable for the OI was found at a JPDO IWP 
website http://jpe.jpdo.gov/ee/request/page?id=1415. The information available includes 
descriptions of the supporting Enablers and associated Policy Issues. 
• Step 3. The same website provided linkage to the Enablers that support the specific 
Enablers defined for the OI, as well as the supporting R&D activities, and the associated 
Policy Issues (see Appendix B for the descriptions of these elements). This information 
was also extracted. 
• Step 4. A diagram that illustrates the relationships among the OI, the supporting 
Enablers, R&D Activities, and Policy Issues was constructed (see Appendix C). 
• Step 5. Hazards were identified as a result of the interactions among human, 
environmental, and machine (both hardware and software) factors, as well as of the 
influences from organizational and extra-organizational factors such as regulations and 
international interoperability.  
 
The main hazards in this OI are loss of safe separation between aircraft, and between 
aircraft and the terrain. Contributory hazards may result from multiple types of interactions: 
machine-machine, machine-environment, human-machine, human-human, environment-
environment, human-environment, as well as from organizational influences and influences from 
factors outside organizations. The next eight subsections describe in more detail the results of 
the hazard analysis by type of interaction and influence.   
3.2.1. Machine-Machine (both Hardware and Software) Interaction 
• Inter-dependency among this OI and ENs, and among ENs (e.g., EN-0039, EN-0212, 
EN-0016, EN-0035, EN-1231, EN-1271) make reliability of the system quite vulnerable  
• Further, reliability is necessary but not sufficient for system safety. For example, 
software can reliably do the wrong thing. 
• Automation may not be reliably aware of, and tracking, all the aircraft for which the 
controller has responsibility (EN-0035)  
• Automation may not be reliably aware of aircraft performance characteristics, including 
any degraded capability (EN-0035)  
Hazards 
in Current System
Hazards 
in NextGen
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• Automation may not be able to reliably track both delegation of separation responsibility 
and whether the aircraft remains within the limits delegated (EN-0035)  
• Interactions between Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) and regular aircraft presents 
unique hazards (EN-0039) 
3.2.2. Machine-Environment Interaction    
The factors from the following Enablers may impact the accuracy of the weather forecast 
and consolidation: 
 
• EN-2680 Methodologies and Algorithms for Weather Assimilation into Decision-Making 
(supported by or related to R-1230, R-2112, R-2114, PI-0086, and PI-0087) 
 This Enabler depends on research, which may, or may not, yield useful results.  
 Models (e.g., wake forecast) and weather forecasts may not be accurate enough 
to yield useful information on the required scales. Automated algorithms for 
extracting relevant weather phenomena or conditions may not exist. Manual 
extracting may not be feasible. 
• EN-2010 NextGen 4D Weather Cube Information – Manual SAS Selection (supported by 
R-2112 and PI-0088) 
 Lack of observations in some areas (e.g., over oceans) 
 Weather satellites are decaying 
 Combining multiple forecasts into a Single Authoritative Source may have the 
tendency to increase the probability of missing extreme events 
 Does an incentive exist for the holders of the best data and highest resolution 
models to share with everyone? 
 Climate change may drive the physics of some forecast models past current valid 
ranges 
• EN-2080 Network-Enabled User-Defined Weather Information Request Function 
(supported by R-2112) 
 Requires predefined weather request or exhaustive search and specification 
language to cover all possible requests 
• EN-2060 Aviation Weather Information System – Network-enable Existing Systems 
(related to or supported by PI-0086, PI-0087, and PI-0088) 
 Will this be implemented over the ocean? 
 Precipitous decline in space observation systems 
 Huge volume of data 
 Differing goals of sensor participants (interest in small scale vs. large scale 
phenomena) 
 Proper metadata needs to exist alongside measurements 
 Quality control of data, sensors (accuracy and calibration) and metadata 
• EN-2410 Weather Forecasts – Consolidated Convective Storm (also applies to EN-
2420, EN-2430, EN-2440, EN-2450): 
 Dense enough data observations? 
 Sufficient resolution of forecast models? 
 Forecast accuracy varies with conditions and time of year 
– Forecasts for periods of benign weather will be more accurate for longer 
periods of time 
– Forecasts for periods of unstable weather (e.g., highly convective 
periods) will only be accurate for shorter periods of time 
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• EN-2430 Weather Forecasts - Consolidated Turbulence 
 Data from observations or reports? Objectivity is required 
 Need to properly translate to different aircraft sizes 
• Issues can arise from interactions among UAS and the above elements (EN-0039) 
• Inaccurate weather forecast and consolidation (e.g., wind speed and direction, air 
temperature, severe weather, and wake turbulence) may impact automation’s prediction 
of aircraft positions [40]. 
3.2.3. Human-Machine Interaction  
• Human factors issues due to high-level automation (EN-0035)  
 Loss of situation awareness  
 False alarms and misses [41], [42] 
 Sub-optimal distribution of workload (in normal vs. abnormal situations) 
 Skill degradation that only becomes apparent when controllers need to take over 
control of traffic manually. Same applies to pilots in highly automated aircraft 
• Human factors issues due to mixed equipage (including UAS vs. regular aircraft) (EN-
0035; EN-0039)  
 Mixed equipage and aircraft may increase workload and vulnerability to error.  
 Research has shown that operations of aircraft with mixed equipage (with and 
without data link) are feasible within the same airspace as long as the number of 
aircraft not equipped with data link is within a limit, but controller workload level 
may be unacceptable if the limit is exceeded [43]. 
• Human factors issues may arise if there is incompatibility or inconsistency among the 
software, for example, two separate but incompatible collision alerting systems, one on 
the ground and one in the cockpit. Software usability is another interaction challenge, for 
example, GUI (Graphic User Interface) associated with high-level automation.  
• Oscillations and instability of an aircraft or even a traffic stream may be caused by 
factors such as automation failures, communication delays, delays in human decision 
and responses. The next section (section 3.3) illustrates this type of problems in an OI-
0349 scenario.   
3.2.4. Human-Human Interaction  
• “NextGen operational concepts will require more effective and efficient communication 
and collaboration among pilots, controllers, dispatch, and maintenance personnel, 
especially during off-nominal events” [44, p. 27].  
 Loss of team situation awareness (e.g., due to using data link and electronic 
flight strips)  
 Insufficient Crew Resource Management (CRM) practice among flight crew 
members, flight crew members and controllers, and flight crew members and 
other operator resources such as dispatchers and maintenance personnel 
3.2.5. Environment-Environment Interaction  
A number of elements are relevant to this category of interaction (EN-2680, EN-2010, EN-
2080, EN-2060, EN-2410, EN-2420, EN-2430, EN-2440, and EN-2450): 
  
• The impact of weather prediction inaccuracy may be greater and less tolerable when the 
aircraft are in close proximity with the terrain. 
• The impact of weather prediction inaccuracy might be greater in the ATM environment 
with denser traffic. 
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3.2.6. Human-Environment Interaction 
Two elements are relevant to this category of interaction (EN-0035 and EN-2680): 
 
• In the NextGen air traffic environment, there might be more communication delays using 
the data link than using voice for communication. 
• Human performance may be impacted by machine-environment interactions (through 
human-machine interactions). For example, weather can impact automation’s accuracy 
in predicting aircraft’s trajectories, which in turn may impact human operators’ behavior 
when they interact with automation.  
3.2.7. Influences from Organizational Factors 
EN-0035 is relevant to this category: 
 
• “Recent changes to the Operational Error program and the Air Traffic Safety Action 
Program (ATSAP) program are aimed at establishing a nonpunitive safety reporting 
program and are a positive first step towards changing the culture and establishing a 
more collaborative relationship with controllers” [45, p. 12]. However, the implications of 
the changes for safety are not fully understood.  
• People may not be able to report unsafe behaviors due to low transparency in high-level 
automation. 
• There might be personnel selection and training issues. Controllers and pilots may not 
have all the required Knowledge, Abilities, and Skills (KAS) in the high-level automation 
environment, although there is evidence that the KAS of the current controllers are 
sufficient for the job with high-level automation. 
3.2.8. Influences from Factors outside Organizations 
• Inadequate R&D (Research & Development) methods and incorrect results such as 
wrong results regarding crew behaviors in the event of automation failures (e.g., EN-
0035). 
• Inadequate policies regarding the role of humans and automation (e.g., PI-0006). 
• Gaps in regulations and standards such as ambiguous traffic rules and separation 
minima in the event of automation failures; ambiguous regulation on how much spacing 
is safe between aircraft with delegated separation (e.g., EN-0035) and lack of standards 
and regulations with respect to integration of UASs into the NAS (e.g., EN-0039 and R-
1190). 
• Global harmonization issues (e.g., PI-0086).  
• Inadequate safety methods, tools, processes, and regulations are also a major hazard to 
the required safety level of NextGen (this will be more fully addressed in the next section 
(section 4). 
 
It should be noted that elements from other OIs may contribute to the hazard situation in this 
OI. For example, factors in OI-0320 Initial Surface Traffic Management, OI-0321 Enhanced 
Surface Traffic Operations, and OI-0322 Low Visibility Surface Operations may impact the 
hazard situation in OI-0349, although the former are not included as elements of the latter. 
Likewise, the elements in this OI (0349) can also impact the safety of other OIs. The complex 
interactions among them may even have implications for the safety of the entire NextGen. 
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3.3. Hazards in a Scenario of OI-0349 
While all the factors and their interactions described in subsections 3.1 and 3.2 are also 
applicable to an OI-0349 scenario whose hazards are analyzed in this subsection, the purpose 
of this analysis is to illustrate, at a high level, how some potential types of dynamic complexity 
involved in a highly automated operation can contribute to the loss of safe separation between 
aircraft and between aircraft and the terrain. These are the main hazards in this OI.   
 
Figure 8 illustrates a scenario in OI-0349. The type of operation selected for the assessment 
is Flight Deck Interval Management – Spacing. A more comprehensive description of both 
simple and complex versions of the scenario is included in Appendix C. Figure 8 shows the 
complex version. This scenario is a decentralized operation, in which the flight crew of each 
trailing aircraft, enabled by automation in the aircraft, is responsible for achieving and then 
maintaining 90-sec spacing (a controller-selected parameter) from the target aircraft 
immediately preceding it in the flow. The air traffic controller, also equipped with automation, 
has the final responsibility for the safe separation between aircraft in the traffic string, and the 
controller-assigned spacing time or distance for which the flight crew is responsible has a buffer 
that provides for any necessary controller intervention to prevent loss of separation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Scenario of Fight Deck Interval Management for Spacing (FIM-S) 
 
Although the algorithm responsible for providing the flight crew with speed guidance for the 
FIM-S task is designed to minimize spacing instability, occasionally perturbations may occur 
(e.g., experienced wind and/or temperature values are significantly different from those used in 
FIM-S system predictions), perhaps exacerbated by an undetected system failure, and may 
cause spacing inaccuracy. In the scenario, spacing within one pair of aircraft close to the head 
of the flow reduces rapidly. Such inaccuracies would normally be detected by the FIM-S system, 
leading to changes in speed guidance and making the flight crew aware by using the FIM-S 
specific symbols on the cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI) as they monitor their spacing 
from the preceding aircraft. Because the flight crew has been removed from the speed control 
loop by the automation’s functionality, and because the flight deck automation was reliable prior 
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to the problem, the flight crew has developed automation complacency, and thus fails to detect 
the inaccurate spacing, allowing the spacing between the two aircraft to become too close.  
 
Similar to the flight deck automation, the ground automation can normally detect the spacing 
reduction, but may occasionally fail to do so. Yet, the controller is supposed to assure 
separation in the case of both airborne and ground automation problems. But similar to the flight 
crew, due to his/her complacency developed in the period of reliable automation, the controller 
fails to monitor or detect the problem. In the worst case, this situation may result in collision, but 
it is more likely the controller will eventually detect the loss of separation, and issue a speed 
reduction instruction that exceeds the capabilities of the FIM-S algorithm in the next aircraft in 
the flow to compensate effectively. Such an event could cause oscillation of the traffic in the 
string in the form of cyclic variation in longitudinal spacing as each aircraft, perhaps through 
flight crew or controller intervention in the FIM-S function, first reacts to rapidly reducing 
spacing, overcompensates, and then uses excessive speed to regain the assigned spacing 
value. This kind of oscillation is a typical result of dynamic complexity and may cause the loss of 
safe separation between aircraft and between aircraft and the terrain.  
 
Further, because of the higher traffic density and the more tightly coupled operations in 
NextGen than in the current system, this hazardous situation may have a more severe 
ramification or impact along the traffic stream than it would in the current system. Other factors 
such as lack of standards for spacing, inappropriate training and safety culture, and global 
interoperability issues may contribute to the hazards in this scenario. It is obvious that the 
complexity in the entire OI-0349 will be greater than what is illustrated in this scenario as the 
latter is only part of the former.    
 
 
4. Assessment of Selected Existing Safety Methods, Tools, 
Processes, and Regulations 
For the safety hazards or issues identified in the above section, we assessed whether a 
selected but representative set of the existing safety methods, tools, processes, and regulations 
are sufficient to provide a suitably high degree of justifiable confidence that the issue will not 
result in a decrease in the safety of air transportation. The assessment was performed in the 
following six steps: 
 
• Step 1. Defined safety methods, tools, processes, and regulations 
• Step 2. Understood the relationship among them  
• Step 3. Defined the scope of the existing safety methods, tools, processes, and 
regulations  
• Step 4. Reviewed the existing methods, tools, processes, and regulations 
• Step 5. Assessed the sufficiency of those methods, tools, processes, and regulations for 
NextGen safety 
• Step 6. Assessed the costs of those methods, tools, processes, and regulations  
 
In the following six subsections, we describe the results of each of the six steps. 
4.1. Definitions of Safety Methods, Tools, Processes, and Regulations 
Safety methods are defined in this study as techniques primarily used for hazard 
identification, risk analysis, risk assessment, and risk treatment. In this document, the two terms 
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(methods and techniques) are used inter-changeably. Safety tools refer to computer programs 
that help to implement methods. For example, fault tree analysis is a method (or technique). 
The various commercial and free software packages that help in conducting fault tree analysis 
are tools. Safety processes here primarily refer to those for safety risk management (SRM), 
safety approval, and certification. Note there are other safety-related processes such as those 
for certification of airmen, credentialing of air traffic controllers, and configuration management 
for ground-based equipment, but our emphasis is on SRM, certification and approval processes 
especially air traffic approval, aircraft certification, and operator certification, which are the core 
safety processes in the air transportation system. Finally, safety regulations in this study are 
government- or industry-imposed safety requirements or standards that must be met by a 
system. 
4.2. Relationship among Safety Methods, Tools, Processes, and Regulations 
Figure 9 illustrates the relationship among safety methods, tools, processes, and 
regulations. The diagram adopts a control-theoretical view of the relationship [29]. For any new 
system such as airborne equipment and ground-based facilities or procedures such as ATC 
procedures that have safety implications, there are two safety-related processes. The first is the 
SRM process; that is, safety experts and operational personnel use various methods and tools 
to perform SRM (description of system, hazard identification, risk analysis, risk assessment, and 
risk treatment) such that risk level (after risk treatment if this is needed) is at or below the 
acceptable level. This acceptable risk level would come from government- or industry-imposed 
regulations (standards or requirements). Aircraft certification, operator certification, and air traffic 
approval all take a risk-based approach to safety. They all have SRM processes in one form or 
another [17], [46], although a (better) system safety approach is desired [47], [48].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Schematic Relationship among Safety Methods, Tools, Processes, and Regulations 
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The second safety-related process is the safety certification or approval process. For 
example, the FAA would approve or certify a new system or procedure as adequately safe for 
deployment or implementation based on the appropriate standards or requirements. The various 
downward arrows in Figure 9 indicate control mechanisms. For example, regulations govern 
how safety certification and approval should be conducted and what methods should be used. 
The upward arrows in Figure 9 show the feedback mechanisms. For example, the results of 
SRM and the safety certification and approval processes would inform whether the existing 
regulations are appropriate.  
4.3. Scope of Existing Safety Methods, Tools, Processes, and Regulations 
The primary emphasis of our assessment is on the methods, tools, processes, and 
regulations that are actually in use or in place for the current US air transportation system. The 
secondary emphasis is on those that are the subject of ongoing consideration or being 
proposed for future use in the United States. These are typically based on the actual or 
perceived gaps in the current methods, tools, processes, and regulations, but which have not 
yet been used or put in place for the US system. Examples of those are FAA’s ongoing methods 
and those proposed in conference papers. Those associated with Single European Sky ATM 
Research (SESAR) (mainly those as part of, or related to, joint U.S.-Europe programs or efforts) 
are also reviewed but at a higher level than for the US counterparts and are granted tertiary 
emphasis. Table 1 is a summary of primary, secondary, and tertiary emphasis. 
 
Table 1. Emphasis of Assessment    
  
 United States 
 
Europe 
In use or in place  
 
Primary Emphasis Tertiary Emphasis 
Ongoing or proposed 
 
Secondary Emphasis Tertiary Emphasis 
4.4. Existing Safety Methods, Tools, Processes, and Regulations 
4.4.1. Existing Safety Methods and Tools 
We first reviewed the traditional safety methods, which were mostly developed for SRM for 
relatively small and simple systems compared to large and complex socio-technical systems. 
Following that, we reviewed relatively new methods, which have been developed for handling 
larger and more complex socio-technical systems typically experiencing multiple and complex 
changes. Also reviewed were methods that have been used or developed specifically for 
assessing NextGen safety. The current processes for SRM, safety certification and approvals, 
along with their respective regulations in the United States were also identified. It needs to be 
pointed out that while we do not claim that our review is exhaustive, we believe it is 
representative, covering some major methods, tools, processes, and regulations, especially 
those used or in place in the United States.  
 
For the traditional methods, we reviewed the following representative documents: 
 
• Ericson [49) – Hazard Analysis Techniques for System Safety 
• Everdij and Blom [50] – Safety Assessment Techniques Database 
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• EUROCONTROL [51] – Review of Techniques to Support the EATMP Safety 
Assessment Methodology 
• FAA [17] – Air Traffic Organization Safety Management System Manual (version 2.1) 
• FAA [16] – System Safety Handbook 
• FAA/EUROCONTROL [52] – ATM Safety Techniques and Toolbox  
• Kanemoto [53] – ATM System Safety Methodology 
• Kritzinger [54] – Aircraft System Safety: Military and Civil Aeronautical Applications 
• NASA [55] – Dryden Handbook Code S System Safety Handbook 
• Netjasov and Janic [56] – A Review of Research on Risk and Safety Modelling in Civil 
Aviation 
• Qureshi [57] – A Review of Accident Modeling Approaches for Complex Critical Socio-
Technical Systems 
• SAE [58] – Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on 
Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment  
• Stephans [59] – Safety Systems for the 21st Century 
• Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia [60] – Safety Management Systems in Aviation 
• System Safety Society [61] – System Safety Analysis Handbook 
 
Of the documents mentioned above, EUROCONTROL [51], Everdij and Blom [50], 
FAA/EUROCONTROL [52], Qureshi [57], and Netjasov and Janic [56] describe and review both 
traditional and new techniques. Notably, EUROCONTROL and Everdij and Blom [50] reviewed 
more than 500 safety assessment techniques (detailed descriptions and reviews of those 
techniques are available in those documents). Based on the more than 500 techniques 
reviewed by EUROCONTROL, FAA/EUROCONTROL [52] identified 27 techniques that are in 
use and are most relevant to ATM safety: 
 
• Air-MIDAS 
• Air Safety Database  
• ASRS (Aviation Safety Reporting System)  
• Bias and Uncertainty Assessment  
• Bow-Tie Analysis  
• CCA (Common Cause Analysis)  
• Collision Risk Models  
• ETA (Event Tree Analysis)  
• External Events Analysis  
• FAST (Future Aviation Safety Team) Method 
• FMECA (Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis)  
• FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)  
• Future Flight Central 
• HAZOP (Hazard and Operability study)  
• HEART (Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique)  
• HERA (Human Error in ATM)  
• HTA (Hierarchical Task Analysis)  
• HTRR (Hazard Tracking and Risk Resolution)  
• Human Error Database  
• Human Factors Case   
• PDARS (Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System)  
• SADT (Structured Analysis and Design Technique)  
• SAFSIM (Safety in Simulation)  
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• SIMMOD Pro (Simulation Model Professional) 
• TOPAZ (Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer) accident risk assessment 
methodology  
• TRACER-Lite  
• Use of Expert Judgment  
 
These techniques are representative and relevant to our study in that 1) they are all 
currently in use, 2) some of them are traditional or classical techniques such as Bow-Tie 
Analysis and FMECA, for relatively simple systems, and some are newer techniques such as 
TOPAZ accident risk assessment methodology, for relatively complex systems involving not 
only technical and human factors, but also organizational and other factors, and 3) they 
collectively cover all the steps of the SRM (hazard identification, risk analysis and assessment, 
and risk treatment). Although those techniques are biased towards those used for ATM, they 
are still somewhat the most relevant techniques for the air transportation system (thus very 
relevant to NextGen) because 1) ATM is a major part of the system, b) ATM is complex and 
some of the 27 methods are quite sophisticated in modeling the complexity involved in ATM and 
the entire air transportation system, and c) the methods used for ATM partly overlap with 
methods used for other aspects of the safety processes such as aircraft certification. For 
example, FTA and ETA are used in both ATM safety assessment and aircraft certification 
process. It needs to be noted that some of the 27 techniques are embedded in some others in 
the same list. For example, FTA and ETA are two components of Bow-Tie Analysis, and Bias 
and Uncertainty Assessment is part of TOPAZ accident risk assessment methodology. Also, 
some of the techniques not specifically listed are embedded in some of the 27 listed techniques. 
For example, TOPAZ accident risk assessment methodology uses the following techniques as 
its integral parts: DCPN (Dynamically Colored Petri Nets), Generalized Reich collision risk 
model, HSMP (Hybrid-State Markov Processes), TOPAZ-based hazard brainstorm, Monte Carlo 
Simulations, Markov Chains, Multiple Agent based modeling, PDP (Piecewise Deterministic 
Markov Processes), and so on [52].   
 
For newer methods, we also reviewed the following: 
 
• STPA (STAMP-based Analysis or System Theoretic Process Analysis): Leveson [30] – 
Engineering a Safer World: System Thinking Applied to Safety  
• STPA and SD (System Dynamics): Dulac [62] – A Framework for Dynamic Safety and 
Risk Management Modeling in Complex Engineering Systems 
• SD: Dulac et al. [63] – Using System Dynamics for Safety and Risk Management in 
Complex Engineering Systems  
• SD: Ulrey and Shakarian [64] – System Dynamics Application in Air Traffic Management: 
A Case Study  
• FRAM (Functional Resonance Analysis Method): Hollnagel [65] – FRAM - the Functional 
Resonance Analysis Method: Modeling Complex Socio-Technical Systems 
• FRAM: EUROCONTROL [66] – A White Paper on Resilience Engineering for ATM 
• SOAM (Systemic Occurrence Analysis Methodology): EUROCONTROL [67] – 
Guidelines on the Systemic Occurrence Analysis Methodology (SOAM) 
• SoS (System of Systems) Hazard Analysis Simulation: Alexander [68] – Using 
Simulation for Systems of Systems Hazard Analysis 
• BBN (Bayesian Belief Network): Ale et al [69] – Causal Model for Air Transport Safety 
Final Report 
• AcciMap: Svedung and Rasmussen [70] – Graphic representation of accident scenarios: 
Mapping system structure and the causation of accidents    
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The following documents were reviewed for the methods used specifically for assessing 
NextGen safety (however, these methods and the traditional and newer methods mentioned 
above are not mutually exclusive): 
 
• Fleming, Spencer, Leveson, and Wilkinson [71] – Safety Assurance in NextGen 
• Consiglio, Hoadley, Wing, Baxley, and Allen [72] – Impact of Pilot Delay and Non-
Responsiveness on the Safety Performance of Airborne Separation 
• JPDO [73] – Capability Safety Assessment of Delegated Interval Management 
• Morello and Ricks [74] – Aviation Safety Issues Database 
• Zelkin and Henriksen [75] – L-Band Digital Aeronautical Communications System 
Engineering – Initial Safety and Security Risk Assessment and Mitigation 
• Zelkin and Henriksen [76] – C-Band Airport Surface Communications System 
Engineering – Initial High-Level Safety Risk Assessment and Mitigation 
• Rogers, Waldron, and Stroiney [77] – Parametric Modeling of the Safety Effects of 
NextGen Terminal Maneuvering Area Conflict Scenarios 
• Ancel, Gheorghe, and Jones [78] – NextGen Future Safety Assessment Game 
• Holmes, Sawhill, Herriot, and Seehart [79] – Development of Complexity Science and 
Technology Tools for NextGen Airspace Research and Applications 
• Andrews, Welch, and Erzberger [80] – Safety Analysis for Advanced Separation 
Concepts 
• Shortle, Sherry, Yousefi, and Xie [81] – Safety and Sensitivity Analysis of the Advanced 
Airspace Concept for NextGen 
• Xu, Brown, Holford, Mast, Singleton, and Wilson [35] – Socio-Technical Framework of 
Hazard Identification in Trajectory-based Operations    
 
Importantly, FAA’s Integrated Safety Assessment Model (ISAM) for NextGen [82] is under 
the FAA’s System Safety Assessment (SSA) project, which is part of the FAA’s System Safety 
Management Transformation (SSMT) program. A key function or objective of ISAM is to identify 
potential negative and positive effects of NextGen OIs on safety.  
 
At its core, ISAM is a risk model that unifies sections from the EUROCONTROL Integrated  
Risk Picture (IRP) model…and from the Causal Model of Air Transport Safety (CATS)…The  
resulting hybrid model emphasizes the complementary contributions of both ATM and NAS  
users (flight crew and aircraft equipment) to safety events in the NAS…ISAM provides a  
comprehensive risk picture for air transport safety. [82, p. 3].  
 
The IRP model was developed by EUROCONTROL [83] and the development of CATS was 
led by the National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) in Netherlands [69]. Among others, ISAM 
includes Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) as its main 
techniques. 
 
The System Safety Society has a list of risk assessment software, including program name, 
source, system, cost, and description for each of the programs [61, pp. B-1 – B-30]. Information 
on some software can also be found in a book titled, Aircraft System Safety: Military and Civil 
Aeronautical Applications [54] and at http://www.aircraftsystemsafety.com/default.asp.   
4.4.2. Existing Safety Processes 
Our review of the existing safety processes was largely based on the SRM process 
described in the FAA ATO (Air Traffic Organization) Safety Management Manual [17], the 
various safety processes summarized in Weibel and Hansman [84], and some of FAA’s ongoing 
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process improvement and streamlining efforts outlined in its AVS Work Plan for NextGen 2012 
[9]. Our review was also based on our experience of participation in safety assessments in 
industry standards development bodies such as RTCA and EUROCAE. 
 
Numerous guidelines exist for how to conduct SRM: 
 
• FAA ATO Safety Management System Manual [17] 
• FAA System Safety Handbook [16] 
• FAA Safety Risk Management Guidance For System Acquisitions (SRMGSA) [85] 
• RTCA guidelines [e.g., 86] 
• SAE guidelines [58] 
• Mil-STD-882 [87] 
 
See Figure 4  for the SRM steps or phases outlined in FAA ATO Safety Management 
System Manual [17]. 
 
One of our major findings, based on our experience of participation in safety assessments in 
industry standards development bodies, is that SRM is performed separately for different air 
transportation system components such as aircraft, operators, and air traffic management. This 
is confirmed by other studies [73], [84]. Sometimes the localized approach is also the case even 
within a component. That is, SRM is performed for individual elements of a component. For 
example, the development of requirements for systems supporting Flight Deck Interval 
Management – Spacing operations is considering the system that provides the guidance (speed 
change and maneuvers) and that will provide clearances for the most complex operations 
(CPDLC) separately, in two different committees. The Automatic Dependent Surveillance-
Broadcast (ADS-B) application and FIM-S system are dealt with by RTCA SC-186/EUROCAE 
WG-51 joint committee, and the data communications side is being dealt with by RTCA SC-
214/EUROCAE WG-78 joint committee. In addition, the work on aircraft capabilities is separate 
from that being performed to define required functionality in air traffic services (ATS) ground 
automation systems. These activities are conducted in parallel with very little coordination 
amongst them.  
 
Similarly, different (and separate) safety approval or certification processes are used for 
different air transportation system components as described in Weibel and Hansman [84]: 
 
• Aircraft and airborne equipment 
• Airmen and air traffic controllers 
• Operators 
• Airspace procedure 
• Separation standards and surveillance system performance 
• Ground-based equipment and programs 
• Software and complex electronic hardware 
• Other safety control processes such as monitoring of current operations, and rulemaking 
 
Figure 10 illustrates (albeit in a simplified version of the reality) the separate processes for 
aircraft certification, operator certification, and ATM approvals. For FAA’s various certification 
and approval organizations, along with their roles and responsibilities, see FAA’s AVS Work 
Plan for NextGen 2012 [9].  
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Figure 10. Separate Processes for Aircraft Certification, Operator Certification, and ATM 
Approvals 
 
Faced with the challenges in NextGen, the FAA has been improving its various safety-
related processes. According to FAA’s AVS Work Plan for NextGen 2012 [9], AVS is 
streamlining certification processes for NextGen technologies in aircraft, including initiatives for 
improving the procedures and methodology of certification. It is also streamlining operational 
approval processes, including approval practices and procedures. Integration and coordination 
among the various AVS individuals and teams are also taking place involving the AVS 
Management Team (AVSMT), Service Management Leads for Aircraft Certification Service 
(AIR), Flight Standards Service (AFS), and Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service (AOV), and AVS 
NextGen Working Group. AIR, AFS, and AOV were primarily established for aircraft certification, 
operator certification, and air traffic approval, respectively. There is also coordination among 
AFS, AIR, and AOV in the field, as well as with the FAA headquarters offices (see Figure 11, [9, 
p. 34]. 
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Figure 11. Coordination among FAA Headquarters and Other AVS Offices 
Key: AFS = Flight Standards Service; AIR = Aircraft Certification Service; AOV = Air Traffic Safety 
Oversight Service; ACO = Aircraft Certification Office 
 
4.4.3. Existing Safety Regulations 
The documents we reviewed for the existing safety regulations are basically the same as 
those for the existing safety processes. Similar to the current safety processes, there are 
different (and separate) safety regulations for different air transportation system components in 
this country as summarized in Weibel and Hansman [84] (also see Figure 10): 
 
• Aircraft airworthiness certification – Airworthiness standards are in FAR 23, 25, 27, 29, 
31, 33, and 35. 
• Certification of subcomponents of aircraft – There are certification processes including 
Supplemental Type Certificates (STC), Technical Standard Orders (TSO), and Parts 
Manufacturing Approval (PMA), which need to follow certain standards in FAA orders or 
advisory circulars. 
• Certification of airmen and credentialing of air traffic controllers – Requirements must be 
met regarding training, medical examination, performance, and so on. 
• Operator certificates and operational approval – FAR Part 91 (General Operating and 
Flight Rules) and FAR Part 121 (Operating Requirements: Domestic, Flag, and 
Supplemental Operation) must be followed, along with other certification requirements. 
• Airspace procedure design and approval – The regulatory agency is FAA’s Flight 
Standards Service (with the internal FAA designation of AFS), which establishes various 
rules such as visual flight rules and instrument flight rules, as well as designs and 
certifies various flight procedures, among others. 
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• Separation standards and surveillance system performance – ICAO guidance and FAA 
standards must be followed. 
• Ground-based equipment and programs (i.e., air navigation facilities) – The FAA uses 
configuration management processes for tracking and coordinating changes to the NAS, 
and safety assessment is part of that. 
• Software and complex electronic hardware – RTCA DO-178B [88] for airborne software 
certification, RTCA DO-278 [89] for non-airborne software in CNS/ATM systems, and 
RTCA DO-254 [86] for complex electronic hardware are the consensus standards. 
Although RTCA DO-178C has been published [90], the FAA has not yet referenced the 
document in materials that can be used in certification (e.g., Advisory Circulars). It is 
expected that the recognition of the use of RTCA DO-178C will happen eventually.  
 
Again, according to FAA’s AVS Work Plan for NextGen 2012 [9], the FAA and other 
organizations such as RTCA/EUROCAE are in the process of updating or developing standards 
and policies relevant to NextGen safety, including those for PBN/RNP, ADS-B, Data 
Communications, Low-Visibility Operations, Avionics Safety Enhancements, and Engine and 
Fuel Technologies. 
4.5. Sufficiency of Existing Safety Methods, Tools, Processes, and Regulations 
As our hazard analysis in the previous section shows, the safety situation in OI-0349 is 
rather challenging, where there are multiple components (aircraft, ground-based facilities, and 
ATC procedures), multiple factors (human, technical, organizational, and other factors), as well 
as dynamic complexity and interactions among the components and factors. An important 
question is whether the existing safety methods, tools, processes, and regulations are sufficient 
to ensure that the current level of safety is not compromised through the deployment of that OI. 
The following subsections describe our assessment regarding safety methods and tools, safety 
processes, and safety regulations, respectively. 
4.5.1. Sufficiency of Existing Safety Methods and Tools 
A set of criteria were developed based on the SRM steps described in FAA [17] and our 
Socio-Technical Framework of Hazard Identification [35]. Various safety methods and tools can 
be evaluated against the criteria below: 
   
• Can a method or a tool cover multiple components (e.g., aircraft, ground-based facilities, 
and ATC procedures)? 
• Can a method or a tool cover multiple factors (human, technical, organizational, and 
other factors)? 
• Can a method or a tool capture dynamic interactions and complexity? 
• Can a method or a tool facilitate systematic risk analysis and assessment? 
• Can a method or a tool facilitate systematic risk treatment? 
 
Table 2 shows the results of our sufficiency assessment of the various methods that we 
consider as most representative and most relevant to NextGen [52]. For illustration, below we 
provide a description of how we reached the ratings for two methods mentioned in this table: 
FTA (a traditional method) and TOPAZ accident risk assessment methodology (a newer 
method).  
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Table 2. Sufficiency of Most Representative Traditional and Newer Methods Safety 
Methods  
 
Method  Cover 
multiple 
components 
(e.g., aircraft, 
ground 
facilities, and 
ATC 
procedures)? 
 
Cover multiple 
factors 
(human, 
technical, 
organizational, 
and other 
factors)? 
 
Capture 
dynamic 
interactions 
and 
complexity? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk analysis 
and 
assessment? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk 
treatment? 
 
Air-MIDAS 
 
Partly 
 
Partly 
 
Partly 
 
Partly 
 
Partly 
 
Air Safety 
Database 
 
Yes Yes No Partly Partly 
ASRS 
(Aviation 
Safety 
Reporting 
System) 
 
Yes Yes No Partly Partly 
Bias & 
Uncertainty 
Assessment 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
Bow-Tie 
Analysis 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
CCA 
(Common 
Cause 
Analysis) 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
Collision 
Risk Models 
(Reich 
Model) 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
ETA (Event 
Tree 
Analysis) 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
External 
Events 
Analysis 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
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Method  Cover 
multiple 
components 
(e.g., aircraft, 
ground 
facilities, and 
ATC 
procedures)? 
 
Cover multiple 
factors 
(human, 
technical, 
organizational, 
and other 
factors)? 
 
Capture 
dynamic 
interactions 
and 
complexity? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk analysis 
and 
assessment? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk 
treatment? 
 
FAST (Future 
Aviation 
Safety Team) 
Method 
 
Yes Partly No Partly Partly 
FMECA 
(Failure 
Modes 
Effects and 
Criticality 
Analysis) 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
FTA (Fault 
Tree 
Analysis) 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
Future Flight 
Central 
 
Partly Partly Partly Partly Partly 
HAZOP 
(Hazard and 
Operability 
study) 
 
Yes Yes No Partly Partly 
HEART 
(Human Error 
Assessment 
and 
Reduction 
Technique) 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
HERA 
(Human Error 
in ATM) 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
HTA 
(Hierarchical 
Task 
Analysis)  
 
Partly Partly No No No 
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Method  Cover 
multiple 
components 
(e.g., aircraft, 
ground 
facilities, and 
ATC 
procedures)? 
 
Cover multiple 
factors 
(human, 
technical, 
organizational, 
and other 
factors)? 
 
Capture 
dynamic 
interactions 
and 
complexity? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk analysis 
and 
assessment? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk 
treatment? 
 
HTRR 
(Hazard 
Tracking and 
Risk 
Resolution) 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
Human Error 
Database 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
Human 
Factors Case 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
PDARS 
(Performance 
Data 
Analysis and 
Reporting 
System) 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
SADT 
(Structured 
Analysis and 
Design 
Technique) 
  
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
SAFSIM 
(Safety in 
Simulation) 
 
Partly Partly Partly Partly Partly 
SIMMOD Pro 
 
Yes Yes Partly Partly Partly 
TOPAZ 
accident risk 
assessment 
methodology 
 
Yes Yes Yes  Needs 
validation 
Needs 
validation 
TRACER-Lite 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
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Method  Cover 
multiple 
components 
(e.g., aircraft, 
ground 
facilities, and 
ATC 
procedures)? 
 
Cover multiple 
factors 
(human, 
technical, 
organizational, 
and other 
factors)? 
 
Capture 
dynamic 
interactions 
and 
complexity? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk analysis 
and 
assessment? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk 
treatment? 
 
Use of Expert 
Judgment 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
 
FTA is one of the most commonly used safety assessment methods. It is used for the 
analysis of hardware failures and to a certain extent of software problems in relatively simple 
systems. It is quite weak when it comes to analysis of human factors issues mainly because it is 
extremely difficult to assign probabilities to human errors. Its applicability to organizational 
factors and extra-organizational factors are also very limited. Therefore, it received “partly” for 
the “Cover multiple factors” criterion. Similarly, FTA is also limited when there are multiple 
components in a system, hence “Partly” for the “Cover multiple components” criterion. The tree 
structure of FTA does a fairly good job for relatively simple situations. For complex situations 
involved in the NextGen elements such as OI-0349, it would do a poor job because the 
complexity, especially the dynamic complexity, cannot be described by a fixed structure such as 
a tree [91]. This is the rationale for assigning “No” for the “Capture dynamic interactions and 
complexity” criterion. Based on those ratings, FTA also received “Partly” for the last two criteria: 
“Facilitate systematic risk analysis and assessment” and “Facilitate systematic risk treatment” 
Note: Some of the advanced versions of FTA such as dynamic fault tree analysis do a better job 
in modeling complexity [92].  
 
TOPAZ accident risk assessment methodology, which was developed by researchers in 
NLR, is one of the most sophisticated modeling techniques. Using a set of tools, it is rather 
robust in identifying hazards from technical factors, human factors, procedures, and 
organizational factors. It is also comprehensive in that it can be used to model multiple 
components in a system. That is the reason why it received “Yes” for the first two criteria: 
“Cover multiple components” and “Cover multiple factors.” This technique also does well in 
modeling the complex interactions among the multiple components and factors. The quantitative 
part of TOPAZ, known as multi-agent dynamic risk modeling (MA-DRM), has shown 
encouraging results when it was used to assess hazards and risks in complex situations (see 
[93] for a comparison between MA-DRM and ETA used in safety assessment of a runway 
incursion scenario). Meanwhile, new TOPAZ or MA-DRM methods and tools are being 
developed to further improve the modeling of complex interactions [93]. More recently, MA-DRM 
is being applied to some SESAR operations [94]. Based on our knowledge of this method, we 
assigned “Yes” for the “Capture dynamic interactions and complexity” criterion. Whether it can 
facilitate systematic risk analysis, assessment, and risk treatment to meet the target level of 
safety for SESAR operations, and similarly for NextGen operations, is a question.  That is the 
reason for “Needs validation” regarding the last two criteria.     
 
Table 3 shows the sufficiency assessment results of some other newer methods, in addition 
to those included in Table 2. As with the description of the rating process for FTA and TOPAZ 
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accident risk assessment methodology shown in Table 2, we provide a description of the rating 
process for two methods shown in this table: STPA and SOAM. 
 
Table 3. Sufficiency of Other Newer Safety Methods 
 
Method  Cover 
multiple 
components 
(e.g., aircraft, 
ground 
facilities, and 
ATC 
procedures)? 
 
Cover multiple 
factors 
(human, 
technical, 
organizational, 
and other 
factors)? 
 
Capture 
dynamic 
interactions 
and 
complexity? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk analysis 
and 
assessment? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk 
treatment? 
 
STPA 
(STAMP-
based 
Analysis) 
 
Yes 
 
Yes Partly Partly Partly 
SD (System 
Dynamics)  
 
Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Partly Partly 
FRAM 
(Functional 
Resonance 
Analysis 
Method) 
 
Yes Yes Partly Partly Partly 
SOAM 
(Systemic 
Occurrence 
Analysis 
Methodology) 
 
Yes Yes No Partly Partly 
SoS (System 
of Systems) 
Hazard 
Analysis 
Simulation 
 
Yes Yes Partly Partly Partly 
Bayesian 
Belief 
Networks  
  
Yes Yes No Partly Partly 
AcciMap 
 
Yes Yes No Partly Partly 
 
 STPA is a method developed by Professor Nancy Leveson at MIT. Based on STAMP 
(Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes), it takes a control theoretical view of system 
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safety and has many advantages compared to many traditional methods. It can be used to 
identify hazards arising from technical, human, and organizational factors and beyond, some of 
which cannot be identified using the traditional methods. It is also powerful when considering 
multiple components of a system. That is the reason why we assigned “Yes” to it for the “Cover 
multiple components” and “Cover multiple factors” criteria. It is robust in identifying many 
interactions among the multitude of factors and components, and to a certain extent, it can also 
support the identification of dynamic parts of system complexity. That is the basis for rating it as 
“Partly” for the last three criteria: “Capture dynamic interactions and complexity,” “Facilitate 
systematic risk analysis and assessment,” and “Facilitate systematic risk treatment.” It needs to 
be pointed out that the combination of STPA and SD seems to be a good approach because SD 
can augment STPA for capturing dynamic complexity as is shown in Dulac [62].  
 
SOAM is a method developed by EUROCONTROL and is based on both the SHEL 
(Software, Hardware, Environment, and Liveware) model [20] and the Swiss cheese model [21]. 
The SHEL model is used for collecting safety-critical data taking into account factors from 
software, hardware, liveware or human, environment, and organization. The collected data are 
then used for guiding the identification of hazards in a Swiss cheese model-like framework with 
the following elements: human involvement, contextual conditions, organizational factors, and 
other system factors. It is also potentially useful for covering multiple components of a system. 
Thus, SOAM receives “Yes” for the “Cover multiple components” and “Cover multiple factors” 
criteria. However, the interactions among factors are not emphasized. Furthermore, it is 
basically a static approach, with no capability to capture the dynamic complexity associated with 
safety issues. This is the basis for assigning “No” for the “Capture dynamic interactions and 
complexity” criteria. As a result, although it is a useful method in some aspects, it “Partly” 
contributes to risk analysis, assessment, and treatment.             
 
Table 4 shows the sufficiency assessment results of some of the methods and tools that 
have been used to assess NextGen safety. Below we describe the rating process for two 
methods whose results are shown in this table: Xu et al. [35] and Borener et al. [82]. 
 
Table 4. Sufficiency of Safety Methods Used for NextGen Operations  
 
Method  Cover 
multiple 
components 
(e.g., aircraft, 
ground 
facilities, and 
ATC 
procedures)? 
 
Cover multiple 
factors 
(human, 
technical, 
organizational, 
and other 
factors)? 
 
Capture 
dynamic 
interactions 
and 
complexity? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk analysis 
and 
assessment? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk 
treatment? 
 
Fleming, 
Spencer, 
Leveson, 
and 
Wilkinson 
[71] 
 
Yes Yes Partly Partly Partly 
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Method  Cover 
multiple 
components 
(e.g., aircraft, 
ground 
facilities, and 
ATC 
procedures)? 
 
Cover multiple 
factors 
(human, 
technical, 
organizational, 
and other 
factors)? 
 
Capture 
dynamic 
interactions 
and 
complexity? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk analysis 
and 
assessment? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk 
treatment? 
 
Consiglio, 
Hoadley, 
Wing, 
Baxley, and 
Allen [72] 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
JPDO [73] 
 
Yes Partly No Partly Partly 
Morello and 
Ricks [74] 
 
Yes Yes No Partly Partly 
Zelkin and 
Henriksen 
[75] 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
Zelkin and 
Henriksen 
[76] 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
Rogers, 
Waldron, 
and 
Stroiney 
[77] 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
Ancel, 
Gheorghe, 
and Jones 
[78] 
 
Yes Yes Partly Partly Partly 
Holmes, 
Sawhill, 
Herriot, and 
Seehart 
[79] 
 
Partly Partly Partly Partly Partly 
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Method  Cover 
multiple 
components 
(e.g., aircraft, 
ground 
facilities, and 
ATC 
procedures)? 
 
Cover multiple 
factors 
(human, 
technical, 
organizational, 
and other 
factors)? 
 
Capture 
dynamic 
interactions 
and 
complexity? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk analysis 
and 
assessment? 
 
Facilitate 
systematic 
risk 
treatment? 
 
Andrews, 
Welch, and 
Erzberger 
[80] 
 
Partly Partly No Partly Partly 
Shortle et 
al. [81] 
 
Partly Partly Partly Partly Partly 
Xu, Brown, 
Holford, 
Mast, 
Singleton, 
and Wilson 
[35] 
 
Yes Yes No Partly Partly 
Borener, 
Trajkov, & 
Balakrishna 
[82] 
 
Yes Yes No Partly Partly 
 
Our Socio-Technical Framework of Hazard Identification [35] is a high-level hazard 
identification and analysis method. It was used for a preliminary hazard analysis applied to 
Trajectory-Based Operations (TBO), one of the key NextGen pillars [35]. This method is quite 
comprehensive in that it can guide the identification of hazards from human, technical, 
environmental, organizational, and other factors that are involved in multiple components 
including aircraft, ground-based facilities, ATC procedures, and so on. This is the basis for 
receiving “Yes” for the “Cover multiple components” and “Cover multiple factors” criteria. It can 
also guide high-level identification of interactions among those components and factors. 
However, it is rather weak when it comes to revealing dynamic interactions. Therefore, it 
receives “No” for “Capture dynamic interactions and complexity” and it can partly contribute to 
the systematic risk analysis, assessment, and treatment; hence, “Partly” for the last two criteria. 
 
The FAA’s Integrated Safety Assessment Model (ISAM) for NextGen as summarized in 
Borener et al. [82] is a comprehensive approach to assessing primarily the safety impacts of 
NextGen OIs. It encompasses multiple personnel and system components including both ATM 
and other NAS users such as flight crew and aircraft equipment, and it may include Airlines 
Operation Centers (AOC) in a future version. Therefore, it receives “Yes” regarding the first two 
criteria. As far as we know, FTA and Event Sequence Diagrams (ESDs) are its main 
assessment methods. As we illustrated for FTA, which is rated in Table 2, the tree structure of 
the two methods is limited for modeling dynamic complexity, leading us to assigning “No ” for 
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the “Capture the dynamic interactions and complexity” criteria and as a result, “Partly” for the 
last two criteria. It is recognized that within ISAM, analysis methods and tools are being 
developed or improved, including near real-time analysis tools that can be used to identify risks 
in new operations [82]. This is thus an evolving method and its modeling capabilities are 
expected to be improving.  
 
Based on the above results, it can be concluded the traditional methods such as FTA, ETA, 
and FMECA are insufficient because they are far from being able to capture the dynamic 
complexity of NextGen, and cover multiple components and factors therein. Some of the newer 
ones such as STPA, SD, FRAM, TOPAZ accident risk assessment methodology, and BBN are 
better than the traditional methods in that respect. Whether a technique is sufficient for NextGen 
safety has also to do with NextGen’s required level of safety; the higher the required level of 
safety, the more sophisticated a technique needs to be. On one hand, NextGen is believed to 
be more complex than the current system; on the other hand, it needs to be safer than the 
current system. Therefore, the sufficiency of some of the newer techniques for NextGen safety 
is a question as well as a concern, and their adequacy requires proof or validation relative to the 
required level of safety. The ongoing methods also need proof or validation for NextGen safety.  
 
Regarding the sufficiency of tools (various computer programs or software), they are 
generally only as good as the methods they are based on. Therefore, the tools are mostly not 
sufficient for NextGen safety or need validation. 
4.5.2. Sufficiency of Existing Safety Processes  
Overall, the existing processes are not sufficient because SRM and approval and 
certification processes are performed for individual components (e.g., aircraft, ground-based 
facilities, and air traffic control procedures), but not for the whole system when they function 
together [73], [84]. It is thus doubtful that the complex interactions among the components are 
adequately identified and addressed. Some of them are not even sufficient for individual 
components: 
 
• SRM processes need to be improved [95]. 
• There is room for improvement in the certification and approval processes [47], [48].   
 
Our assessment is consistent with JPDO [73], which states the following: 
 
To ensure NextGen safety, it is necessary to assess the system as a whole, which means it  
must be designed as a whole. Often, systems are designed and assessed as individual  
pieces with the expectation that if the subsystems are safe, the system will be safe. A piece- 
wise approach is seen throughout the aviation system. Aircraft, airports, airspace, air traffic  
management, and flight crews are individually certified as safe, and then expected to remain  
safe when functioning together. As NextGen introduces an ever-widening range of variables,  
it is even more critical that NextGen be designed and implemented as an integrated ‘safety  
of the whole’ system. [73, pp. 24-25]. 
 
Although the FAA is streamlining its certification and approval processes, and integration 
and coordination within the agency are improving, it needs to be seen whether those efforts are 
sufficient to address NextGen safety as an entirety, rather than in a stovepipe fashion.   
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4.5.3. Sufficiency of Existing Safety Regulations  
There are inherent shortcomings in regulations. Regulations cannot cover everything; they 
tend to compartmentalize things; they are slow to keep up with technology changes; and they 
can be too prescriptive [54]. These weaknesses will manifest themselves more when faced with 
the NextGen complexity. Further, the regulations do not appear to be sufficient because 
different standards and requirements are imposed for the safety of individual components, but 
not for the safety of the whole system. Similar to the FAA’s efforts to streamline its certification 
and approval processes, the FAA needs to show that its work to update and develop safety-
related standards is sufficient to meet NextGen safety requirements. In fact, the FAA AVS 
acknowledges the need to evaluate the relevant operational regulations, to identify needed 
changes to regulations, and to develop new regulations [9]. 
4.6. Costs of Existing Safety Methods, Tools, Processes, and Regulations 
Another important question is whether the existing methods, tools, processes, and 
regulations might incur intolerably high costs for assessing and ensuring NextGen safety. In this 
study, cost assessment was performed qualitatively rather than quantitatively. Given that the 
current approach is mostly insufficient for assuring NextGen safety, we assessed the costs first 
in terms of those associated with an inadequate approach (methods, tools processes, and 
regulations). Cost assessment can also be conducted in terms of those associated with 
developing and implementing an adequate approach.  
4.6.1. Costs of Inadequate Approach  
The existing methods, tools, processes, and regulations rely on the known performance of 
existing systems, and safety assessments are conducted for single changes or minor changes. 
That is not the way NextGen elements are likely to be introduced. Rather, many of them will be 
introduced at the same time or within short intervals. Therefore, this existing approach would 
take an intolerably long time (because it is only appropriate for incremental changes introduced 
in a serial fashion), and would need a lot of resources to assess the safety of NextGen elements 
and yet still not likely to achieve the required NextGen level of safety because of the NextGen 
complexity.   
 
Inadequate safety methods, tools, processes, and regulations can lead to incorrect 
conclusions being drawn and inappropriate requirements set. As a result, systems can be 
developed that do not provide the level of performance required to keep system safety at or 
above the preceding level. In many cases, the conservative nature of the safety processes 
means that the level of safety will be preserved, but this will not always be the case. 
Inadequacies may be discovered during airworthiness certification or during operational 
approval, or even after the new operational function is in revenue service. In such cases, the 
regulator imposes additional or different requirements, and these changes are rolled back into 
published requirements that will govern the design of systems for forward fit. Operators may be 
required to update or replace systems already in service, sometimes at significant cost. During 
transition from old to new systems, whether through retrofit or through addition to or 
replacement of aircraft in their fleets, operators must maintain spares of both standards to 
ensure that failures can be corrected with the appropriate parts. This increases spares holdings 
at additional cost to the operator. Even software changes in the same hardware can result in a 
part number change that creates the same lack of commonality among those aircraft on which 
the service bulletin has been satisfied and those on which it has not, and a similar requirement 
for additional spares and close management of maintenance and repair functions. An example 
of such a series of events follows. 
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During the 1990s, Europe determined that transponder capabilities (specifically the 
availability of only 4096 Mode A codes) were inadequate to ensure that each aircraft operating 
during a day could be issued with a unique Mode A code, and developed a mandate for what 
was known as ‘Elementary Surveillance’ (ELS). ELS would add to the capabilities of the aircraft 
transponder by transmitting on Mode S the individual aircraft’s 24-bit ICAO address to be used 
as a unique form of identification. At the same time, requirements for ‘Enhanced Surveillance’ 
(EHS) were written for later implementation. However, some European states determined that 
there would be benefit in their receiving the additional data transmitted by EHS, and replaced 
the ELS mandate with one for EHS. The avionics manufacturers saw an opportunity to develop 
a transponder that satisfied current Mode A, C and S requirements plus both ELS and EHS. 
Also, because the FAA and EUROCONTROL had agreed that the transmission medium for 
ADS-B should be Mode S (at least for aircraft likely to operate internationally), it would be a 
good opportunity to incorporate the ADS-B function into the new transponder. 
 
Unfortunately, stand-alone requirements for ADS-B Out were still in development at that 
time, but a higher-level standard was available, and it was to this that the included ADS-B Out 
function was designed. This became the ‘DO-260-like’ version (Version 0) of ADS-B Out. As 
operators began to equip with transponders that would satisfy ELS and EHS mandates, many 
chose to satisfy the service bulletin that would activate the ADS-B Out function; however, the 
ADS-B functionality was not certified for anything but “non-interference,” and a Flight Manual 
addition proscribed its operational use. By the time Boeing began to install these transponders 
(early 2004), the shortcomings of the ADS-B standard had been recognized and a new standard 
(DO-260A) had been published. However, since the ELS/EHS mandate was imminent, it was 
not possible to satisfy DO-260A requirements at that time. 
 
Both Europe and the United States then set dates for mandates for ADS-B Out equipage, 
but the FAA recognized that the ATS ground system could not function well without the 
transponder Mode A code’s being included in the ADS-B message, so a new standard, DO-
260B was developed and published. It is to this standard that mandated equipage must be 
responsive in the United States, and in response to a desire for interoperability, also in Europe. 
However, ADS-B is, by its nature, a data gathering and transmitting function, and the United 
States and Europe have specified different data quality requirements in their mandates, 
illustrating a parallel issue with safety assessment methods (that different methods and/or 
different practitioners result in different answers to the same question). As a result, 
interoperability will not be achieved, and for aircraft operating in the United States, the vast 
majority of GPS receivers will have to be replaced to satisfy ADS-B data quality requirements, 
again at additional cost. 
 
In the meantime, significant operational trials have been conducted in Europe utilizing the 
original Version 0 equipment as a surveillance data source for ground surveillance and 
separation assurance. The safety case used to show that Version 0 satisfied requirements was 
adopted by other countries, not on a trials basis, but for permanent operational use, and 
benefits are being derived from the Version 0 equipment in ATS procedures for which other 
states judge the system unsafe. The FAA’s ground system will not send Version 0 data to 
controller screens, and the FAA has stated that only DO-260B data will be usable for separation 
services. However, an exception has been made for some operations in the FAA-controlled 
portion of the Gulf of Mexico, where DO-260A equipment is providing surveillance data that is 
used for separation services. 
 
This is a good illustration of the issues that can arise when new technologies and new 
procedures associated with both new and current technologies are introduced. There will be 
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little understanding of the new procedures and the technical functions needed to support them 
in the aviation community as a whole. Requirements are developed by groups of technical and 
operational experts who are extending their horizons to understand what is expected. Many 
participants are there on a voluntary basis representing manufacturers, operators, and 
professional organizations, each with an agenda to satisfy; others are representatives of the 
ATS provider and regulator with goals that relate to meeting deadlines and completing projects. 
In development of requirements for operational applications supported by ADS-B data on the 
flight deck, despite the fact that ATS ground system functionality will be required to enable a 
beneficial operation, the standards groups have not been permitted to levy requirements against 
the ground system. Resulting standards can only make assumptions about future ground 
system functionality, assumptions that have no guarantee of being met. If they are not met, how 
valid will the requirements levied against the airborne systems be? If these kinds of past lessons 
are not learned, the same or similar issues may emerge during the transition to, and 
implementation of, NextGen. 
 
Further, because different methods, tools, processes, and regulations exist for different 
components (e.g., aircraft, ground-based facilities, and ATC), resources may not be utilized in 
an optimized way, yet again likely without achieving the required NextGen level of safety. Costs 
of this approach also include those of not providing the required level of safety for NextGen 
including, at one extreme, a potentially intolerable number of accidents, but more likely limiting 
the benefits available through added operational conservatism and ultimately by requiring 
system upgrades to achieve the desired levels of safety and operational benefit.  
4.6.2. Costs of Adequate Approach    
The type of approach to NextGen safety, by use of systematic methodology and of 
integrated tools, processes, and regulations, is likely to demand high levels of expertise and 
technological support. These resources will be employed over a significant timeframe. That is, 
methods and tools must be validated to show that hazards resulting from dynamic complexity of 
the combination of NextGen elements under consideration can be reliably identified while taking 
into account multiple components and multiple factors, and the resultant risks can be 
adequately treated. Processes and regulations must also be developed or modified to be 
adequate given the dynamic complexity. The need to coordinate among the large number of air 
transportation system stakeholders will add to the time taken to develop acceptable methods 
and to work through the safety processes. The result of satisfying such needs is inevitably 
higher cost.  
 
Despite the length of time that will have to be dedicated to an adequate safety approach, it 
is likely that the time taken to achieve an acceptable outcome in the form of an air transportation 
system that is safe and efficient in accommodating traffic demand will be shorter than that taken 
if an inadequate safety approach is used. In the latter case, the initial time may be relatively 
shorter, but the result may fall short of the targeted level of safety, resulting in constraints being 
placed on capacity or efficiency until safety levels can be raised by additional effort. While costly 
in the short term, the adequate approach can be expected to cost less overall than the 
inadequate approach. The adequate approach will result in an optimal combination of safety, 
efficiency, and capacity without need for changes in the form of avionics retrofit, procedure 
amendment, additional training, and ground system modification, all of which are costly. The 
tolerability of the cost of providing an adequate approach to safety assurance must be weighed 
against the benefits that might be derived in terms of efficiency and capacity and also against 
the potential costs of an inadequate approach. 
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5. Conclusions 
We surveyed a large number of NextGen documents and databases, and identified NextGen 
elements in the form of Operational Improvements (OIs), Enablers, Research Activities, 
Development Activities, and associated Policy Issues from the JPDO’s NextGen Integrated 
Work Plan (IWP), the FAA Enterprise Architecture (NAS EA), and the FAA NextGen 
Implementation Plan (NGIP). 
 
Several features of NextGen may contribute to the overall challenging hazard situation, 
including higher traffic density, higher levels of automation, more tightly-coupled operations, 
more decentralized operations, and the introduction of multiple elements within a short time. For 
a representative NextGen OI, OI-0349 (Automation Support for Separation Management), we 
performed a high-level hazard analysis, which is a preliminary hazard analysis in the concept 
phase of a system’s life cycle. More specifically, we used our Socio-Technical Framework of 
Hazard Identification to identify high-level hazards, illustrating how interactions among various 
factors may generate hazards. For a scenario of OI-0349 with high levels of both airborne and 
ground automation, we identified hazards in Flight Deck Interval Management – Spacing 
(FIM-S), highlighting the potential level of dynamic complexity not experienced in operations in 
the current system. 
 
The safety of NextGen depends largely on the sufficiency of safety methods, tools, 
processes, and regulations. The existing methods and tools, especially those used in the United 
States, do not appear to be sufficient to identify the hazards in the NextGen elements and 
assess their risks given the high degree of dynamic complexity in the elements. Some (e.g., 
STPA, SD, FRAM, TOPAZ) may be better than others, but need proof. The processes and 
regulations in this country are also not sufficient because individual components are assessed 
and approved separately, but not as a whole system. Some of them are not sufficient even for 
the individual components. From the system and control-theoretical perspective [30], the 
insufficient methods, tools, processes, and regulations themselves may impose a significant 
hazard to NextGen safety.  
 
Further, inadequate methods, tools, processes, and regulations might incur intolerably high 
costs in the long term, including costs of not meeting the required NextGen safety level. On the 
other hand, an adequate approach can also be costly because of the time and resources 
required for the development, validation, and implementation. However, its costs should be 
weighed against the costs of an inadequate approach.  
 
 
6. Recommendations 
      Based on the above assessments, we would like to make several recommendations, which 
we beelive may lead to improvements. The first set of recommendations outlines what needs to 
be done with respect to safety methods, tools, processes, and regulations for NextGen safety: 
 
• Identify or determine the desired or target level of safety in NextGen because it has 
implications for whether methods, tools, processes, and regulations are sufficient. 
• Be innovative on new methods and tools including exploration of combining or 
integrating the existing ones (e.g., combining or integrating two or more of, FTA, User of 
Expert Judgment, STPA, SD, BBN, TOPAZ, and SIMMOD Pro). This is not only 
necessary for individual NextGen elements, but also important for interactions among 
OIs, and for the entire NextGen. 
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• Sort out the relationship among various safety techniques and tools and compare their 
relative effectiveness.  
• Continue developing and modifying processes and regulations. 
• Validate new or proposed methods, tools, processes, and regulations.
• Coordinate methods, tools, processes, and regulations so that they can work together to 
achieve NextGen’s required level of safety.  
• Further assess the costs of an inadequate safety approach and an adequate approach.  
 
What are also needed are more systematic assessments of the safety methods, tools, 
processes, and regulations associated with SESAR. SESAR bears many similarities to NextGen 
and its safety challenges are similar to those of NextGen. Our preliminary assessment of 
SESAR suggests that the standard or old methods, tools, processes, and regulations in Europe 
are not sufficient for SESAR safety. Numerous efforts in Europe are addressing this 
inadequacy. The United States can adopt some of the European approaches and practices. For 
example, inspirations can be taken and lessons can be learned from dynamic risk modeling 
[92], which has been applied to the safety assessment for some current operations in Europe 
and is being applied to SESAR operations [96], [97]. In fact, there have been collaborations 
between the United States and Europe regarding NextGen and SESAR safety (e.g., [82]). 
Information exchanges regarding NextGen and SESAR are also important for interoperability 
between the two systems and have important global implications.  
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Appendix A – Acronyms and Abbreviations 
 
4D     Four-dimensional 
A/C     Aircraft 
ACO    Aircraft Certification Office 
ADS-B    Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
AFS    Flight Standards Service 
AIR     Aircraft Certification Service   
Air-MIDAS   Air Man-Machine Integrated Design and Analysis System 
ANSP    Air Navigation Service Provider 
AOC    Airline Operations Center 
AOV    Air Traffic Safety Oversight Service 
ASDE    Airport Surface Detection Equipment 
ASRS     Aviation Safety Reporting System  
ATC    Air Traffic Control 
ATS    Air Traffic Services 
ATM    Air Traffic Management 
ATO    Air Traffic Organization 
ATSAP    Air Traffic Safety Action Program 
ATS    Air Traffic Service 
AVS    Aviation Safety 
AVSMT    AVS Management Team 
BBN    Bayesian Belief Network 
CATS    Casual Model of Air Transport Safety 
CCA    Common Cause Analysis 
CDTI    Cockpit Display of Traffic Information 
CIWS    Corridor Integrated Weather System 
CNS    Communication, Navigation and Surveillance 
ConOps    Concept of Operations 
CONUS    Continental United States 
CPDLC    Controller Pilot Data Link Communication 
CRM    Crew Resource Management 
D     Development 
DCPN    Dynamically Colored Petri Nets 
DHS    Department of Homeland Security 
DNS    Domain Name Service 
DO-     Document 
DOC    Department of Commerce 
DOD    Department of Defense 
DOJ    Department of Justice 
EA     Enterprise Architecture 
EATMP    European Air Traffic Management Programme 
EHS    Mode S Enhanced Surveillance 
ELS    Mode S Elementary Surveillance 
ESD    Event Sequence Diagram 
EN     Enabler 
ETA    Event Tree Analysis 
EUROCONTROL European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation 
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EUROCAE   European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment 
FAA     Federal Aviation Administration 
FAST    Future Aviation Safety Team 
FCAPS    Fault, Configuration, Administration, Performance, and Security 
FID     Flight Identification 
FIM-S    Flight Deck Interval Management – Spacing 
FIS-B    Flight Information Service-Broadcast 
FMECA    Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
FRAM    Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
FTA    Fault Tree Analysis 
GAO    Government Accountability Office 
GNSS    Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPS    Global Positioning System 
GUI     Graphical User Interface 
HAZOP    Hazard and Operability study 
HEART    Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique 
HERA    Human Error in ATM 
HSMP    Hybrid-State Markov Processes 
HSPD    Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
HTA     Hierarchical Task Analysis 
HTRR    Hazard Tracking and Risk Resolution 
ICAO    International Civil Aviation Organization 
IEEE    Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
IRP     Integrated Risk Picture 
ISAM    Integrated Safety Assessment Model 
ISO     International Organization of Standardization 
ITWS    Integrated Terminal Weather System 
IWP    Integrated Work Plan 
JPDO    Joint Planning and Development Office 
JPE     Joint Planning Environment 
KAS    Knowledge, Abilities, and Skills 
LDAP    Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 
MA-DRM   Multi-Agent Dynamic Risk Modeling 
MIT     Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
NAS    National Airspace System 
NASA    National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NCI     Net-Centric Infrastructure 
NEI     Net-Enabled Infrastructure 
NEO    Net-Enabled Operations 
NextGen   Next Generation Air Transportation System 
NGIP    NextGen Implementation Plan 
NLR    National Aerospace Laboratory 
OI     Operational Improvement 
OSA    Operational Safety Assessment 
PBN    Performance-Based Navigation 
PDARS    Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System 
PDP    Piecewise Deterministic Markov Processes 
PI     Policy Improvement 
PIREP    Pilot Report 
PKI     Public Key Infrastructure 
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PMA    Parts Manufacturing Approval 
PNT    Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 
QoS    Quality of Service 
R     Research 
R&D    Research & Development 
RNAV    Area Navigation 
RNP    Required Navigation Performance 
RTCA    Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
SADT    Structured Analysis and Design Technique 
SAE    Society of Automotive Engineers 
SAFSIM    Safety in Simulation Method 
SAS    Single Authoritative Source 
Sec     Seconds 
SD     System Dynamics 
SESAR    Single European Sky ATM Research 
SHEL    Software, Hardware, Environment, and Liveware 
SIMMOD Pro  Simulation Model Professional 
SLA    Service Level Agreement 
SMS    Safety Management System 
SOAM    System Occurrence Analysis Methodology 
SoS    System of Systems 
SRM    Safety Risk Management 
SSA    System Safety Assessment 
SSMT    System Safety Management Transformation 
STAMP    Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
STC    Supplemental Type Certificate 
STI     Scientific and Technical Information 
STPA    STAMP-based Analysis or System Theoretic Process Analysis 
TBO    Trajectory-Based Operations 
TFM    Traffic Flow Management 
TM     Trajectory Management 
TMA    Traffic Management Advisor 
TMU    Traffic Management Unit 
TOPAZ   Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer  
TRACEr-Lite   Technique for the Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of Cognitive  
     Error 
TSO    Technical Standard Order 
UAS    Unmanned Aircraft System 
U.S.    United States 
WG     Working Group 
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Appendix B – Elements of OI-0349 (Automation Support for 
Separation Management) 
B.1. Enablers 
EN-0039 UAS Detail Operation Concept 
 
A policy decision will be made regarding how Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations 
will be incorporated in the national airspace system. This decision includes standards for 
separation of UASs from other aircraft, procedures for UAS operations, requirements for 
onboard equipment, such as sense and avoid systems, and may encompass a set of standards 
for UASs with various performance and operational characteristics and equipage. 
 
EN 0212 Parameter Driven Aircraft Separation Standards and Procedures 
 
Separation management standards and procedures that allow Air Navigation Service 
Provider's (ANSP) and flight operators to safely manage separation using aircraft parameters 
and operating conditions. Safe separation standards and procedures will reflect aircraft 
capabilities, wake turbulence characteristics, operational geometries, and environmental 
conditions. 
 
EN-0016 Separation/Trajectory Management Detail Operational Concept 
 
The operational concept that defines the future roles of humans and automation to perform 
Separation and Trajectory Management (TM) functions in the NextGen environment. This 
concept will include roles for Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP) as well as flight operator 
personnel. The concept will define the division of responsibilities that will guide the development 
of procedures and automation system requirements. 
 
EN 0035 Separation Management Decision Support - Level 1 
 
Separation Management Decision Support, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP) 
automated decision support tools that support the safe management and execution of 
separation procedures and standards in all airspace domains. This capability incorporates real-
time information from ground-based and aircraft systems, and integrated trajectory management 
procedures and standards. These tools enhance NAS' ability to ensure that aircraft are safely 
separated from potential conflicts from other aircraft, wake turbulence, terrain, restricted 
airspace, and obstacles. Separation management is integrated with Trajectory Management, 
capacity and flow contingency management support tools using a net-centric infrastructure and 
system wide information management providing full situational awareness of all elements 
needed, such that potential conflicts can be automatically detected. These decision support 
tools will recommend and support the execution of conflict resolution with separation 
management being negotiated and delegated among ANSP and flight operations for all 
operations. 
 
EN-1231 NextGen Enterprise Network – FAA 
 
Within the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) enterprise, NextGen information is 
managed and shared using a service-oriented enterprise network. As part of the overall 
NextGen enterprise network, this FAA-specific enterprise network provides internal services, 
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supports internal users, and exchanges NextGen information with non-FAA sources. Current 
plans envision this FAA enterprise network to operate on the FTI (FAA Telecommunications 
Infrastructure) with direction from the SWIM (System Wide Information Management) program. 
This enterprise network: (1) complies with NextGen minimum standards for network 
management and infrastructure/security services, (2) is deployed on an FAA physical network 
(links, switches, routers, etc.), (3) is tested and validated, and (4) is specific to FAA operational 
requirements and supports the delivery of FAA information services. As services are deployed, 
network managers must ensure that the enterprise network capacity and performance is 
sufficient to support the Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and quality of service (QoS) 
requirements associated with the information services. The availability date for this enabler 
reflects compliance with published NextGen standards. 
 
EN-1015 Enterprise Network Management Standards 
 
NextGen enterprise network management standards are authorized and published. All 
agency network management groups that participate in the NextGen information sharing 
environment must meet minimum standards. Network management is a continuous activity 
aimed at ensuring the successful operation of an enterprise network. A network management 
system typically consists of network managers assisted by automated tools running on and off 
the network. The International Organization of Standardization (ISO) Network Management 
Model establishes a framework for network management within and across network enclaves, 
business organizations, and integrated communities. The functional categories include Fault, 
Configuration, Administration, Performance, and Security (FCAPS) management. The goal of 
Fault Management is to recognize, isolate, correct and log faults that occur in the network. The 
goals of Configuration Management are to gather and store configurations from network devices 
(either locally or remotely), track changes which are made to the configuration, and to configure 
('provision') circuits or paths through non-switched networks. The goals of Administration 
Management are to administer the set of authorized users by establishing users, passwords, 
and permissions, and to administer the operations of the equipment such as by performing 
software backup and synchronization. The goal of Performance Management (PM) is to enable 
the manager to prepare the network for the future and to determine the efficiency of the current 
network, using throughput, percentage utilization, error rates and response time's metrics to 
mange the network efficiency. The goal of Security Management is to control access to assets 
in the network, including such aspects as physical security of network equipment and boundary 
protection policies regarding firewalls, gateways, and other network connections. Network 
security policies must be continuously enforced. In addition to FCAPS, life-cycle management 
must be addressed for all network infrastructures (hardware, software, standards and protocols, 
etc.). Network designers and implementers must also factor into their plans the need for network 
expansion (new services, new users) and/or performance upgrades while maintaining 
continuous operations. 
 
EN-1230 Enterprise Networking Governance Structure 
 
A governance structure (a body with defined membership and processes) is established to 
develop and authorize common requirements related to enterprise networking that will be 
applied across agencies. The goal of this governance structure is to ensure cross-agency 
interoperability and standardization while minimally limiting agency flexibility in its 
implementation decisions. This governance group will publish cross-agency requirements 
regarding standards and protocols in areas such as enterprise network management, 
infrastructure, and information sharing. 
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EN-1229 Enterprise Networking Governance Model 
 
This is the high-level governance model for guiding enterprise network implementations 
across agencies. This governance model will describe the governance structure (a body with 
defined membership and processes) that will define cross-agency requirements related to 
enterprise networks including network management, infrastructure, and information sharing. 
 
EN-1016 Enterprise Networks Infrastructure Services Standards 
 
NextGen enterprise network infrastructure services standards and protocols are authorized 
and published. All agency enterprise networks that participate in the NextGen information 
sharing environment must meet minimum standards. In a service-oriented enterprise network, 
infrastructure services support the management and transport of data within and across network 
enclaves, business organizations, and integrated communities in a standardized and common 
manner. These infrastructure services include Registry/Discovery and Message Mediation. The 
goal of the Registry/Discovery Service is to provide the Enterprise Service locations and 
protocol bindings that are available. Standards related to Registry/Discovery should address the 
service registration process, guidelines for registry content, a framework for Service Level 
Agreements (SLAs), and metadata repositories related to service registry entries. On the same 
theme as Registry/Discovery, the standards should also address the use of lower-level network 
organization protocols such as DNS and LDAP. The goal of Message Mediation is to provide 
mechanisms to support service invocation styles (e.g., publish/subscribe, request/reply) and 
data exchange protocols. It enables message routing including the structures and metadata 
supporting intelligent (e.g., content-based) routing and policy. The mediation function must 
provide messaging Quality of Service (QoS) including priority and response time for each 
transaction. Infrastructure services standards should also describe the monitoring and reporting 
mechanisms necessary to continuously assess the health of infrastructure services and assure 
proper operation. 
 
EN-1043 Enterprise Networks Security Services Standards 
 
NextGen enterprise network security services standards and protocols are authorized and 
published. All agency enterprise networks that participate in the NextGen information sharing 
environment must meet minimum standards. The goal of security services is to enforce security 
policies at the service and message level including providing authorization-based access to data 
and services (identity and role-based access control). Security services allow users to access 
the information they need, while securing classified/sensitive data from access by unauthorized 
persons and protecting networks from intended/unintended corruption by 'malicious' or hidden 
code. Security services ensure both publishers and subscribers can verify identities, 
authenticate themselves, and assert access privileges. Identification and authentication can be 
accomplished using services such as Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) services. Leveraging 
encryption, security services also ensure confidentiality and information integrity by guarding 
against unauthorized modification of data and services. Security services standards should also 
describe the monitoring and reporting mechanisms necessary to continuously assess the health 
of security services and assure proper operation. 
 
EN-1271 Flight and Surveillance Information Services - FAA Group 1 
 
This enabler provides the initial group of services for the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) delivery of flight and surveillance information. Flight information includes flight plan data 
(aircraft identification, planned routes and times, etc.). Surveillance information includes current 
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aircraft track data (position and other real time characteristics) for the en route and surface 
domains. Clearance delivery and taxi status information is also available. These information 
services are implemented on the FAA's enterprise network, where they can be accessed by 
outside users (other agencies, third parties) via authorized gateways/portals. Service and 
infrastructure implementation must take into consideration the required bandwidth and quality of 
service (QoS). 
 
EN-1025 Airport Surface Surveillance - Legacy ASDE-X 
 
The Airport Surface Detection Equipment Model - 3/X (ASDE-3/X) provides integrated 
airport surface surveillance - via plot level fusion of radar technology, multilateration, Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), & aircraft equipment. Fused track plot data is then 
placed on Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) tower display. This is a closed non-network 
system. Provides aircraft and other ground vehicle positions and movement on the surface of 
the airport. 
 
EN-1251 Information Sharing Standards: Flight and Surveillance Information 
 
The net-centric governance structure publishes authorized standards for providing and 
exchanging flight and surveillance information across the Net-Centric Infrastructure (NCI) of the 
NextGen enterprise. These standards define the technical vocabulary, schemas, metadata, 
business processes, and related specifications essential to the net-centric exchange of flight 
and surveillance information. Flight and surveillance information includes: flight plan data, 
surveillance for airborne and surface traffic (cooperative and non-cooperative), clearance 
delivery, and taxi status. These standards enable services to share information in a consistent 
and uniform way. 
 
EN-2680 Methodologies and Algorithms for Weather Assimilation into Decision-
Making 
 
This enabler provides guidance, methodologies, and algorithms for weather assimilation into 
decision-making. This is accomplished through initial, crosscutting, foundational research such 
as: translation of weather's impact on operations, operational metrics development, 
determination of NextGen relevant weather information, basic mathematical research into 
optimization methodologies, operational research analysis, techniques for the presentation of 
probabilistic information to humans and automation, characterization of hazardous weather 
phenomena (e.g., estimation of aircraft-specific weather hazard levels, pilot likelihood to deviate, 
permeability of weather), benefits pool estimation, and weather forecast verification. This near-
term research will likely produce more immediately useable results for weather assimilation for 
the en route and terminal domains, because of the current maturity of research in en route 
weather conflict prediction and resolution; arrival/departure separation standards due to wake 
vortex turbulence; and ceiling and visibility impacts on airport arrival rates. Another reason these 
capabilities are anticipated in the near-term is that the look-ahead time for the required weather 
is relatively short, resulting in levels of weather uncertainty that can be more easily addressed. 
Some early, less sophisticated results in the assimilation of weather in the Traffic Flow 
Management (TFM) domain and surface operations may also be achieved. 
 
EN-0301 Performance-Based Separation Standards and Procedures 
 
Performance-Based procedures and standards allow the Air Navigation Service Provider 
(ANSP) and Flight Operators to conduct reduced oceanic, en route, and terminal separation, 
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such as: - 3-mile en route separation - alternatives evaluation and selection - 3-mile en route 
separation procedures - non-mosaic display - 5-mile non radar airspace separation procedures - 
Variable wake-based separation standards and procedures - Reduced oceanic separation 
standards and procedures The en route procedures provide accurate aircraft positional 
information to pilots and ground-based controllers enabling the reduction of separation to 3 
miles, or 5-mile reduction which accommodates new larger aircraft and collision or wake 
turbulence encounter risk limits. Space-based data and voice communication provides direct 
controller-pilot communications enabling alternative trajectory operations. 
 
EN-2010 NextGen 4D Weather Cube Information - Manual SAS Selection 
 
The 4D Weather Data Cube, with non-automated Single Authoritative Source (SAS) 
selection, will provide the Initial Operational Capability. Weather analyses, diagnoses and 
forecasts are available to all users over a network-enabled infrastructure. Weather information 
for this level will include, at a minimum, winter weather, convection, icing, turbulence, and 
restrictions to visibility. This enabler includes development of business rules and capabilities to 
process weather observations and multiple forecast capabilities into a single, authoritative, four-
dimensional (4D) weather source available across varied space and time scales. The initial SAS 
may be limited to a subset of aviation weather parameters (e.g., convection, turbulence) and 
may be determined using objective data such as verification results for various forecast 
alternatives through a human-based selection process. 
 
EN 1273 NextGen Weather Information Services - FAA Group 1 
 
This enabler provides the initial group of services for the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) delivery of weather information including: Pilot Weather Reports (PIREPs), Integrated 
Terminal Weather System (ITWS) products, and Corridor Integrated Weather System (CIWS) 
products. ITWS and CIWS focus on convective weather near airports and en route, respectively. 
These information services are implemented on the FAA's enterprise network, where they can 
be accessed by outside users (other agencies, third parties) via authorized gateways/portals. 
 
EN-2080 Network-Enabled User-Defined Weather Information Request Function 
 
The Weather Request function will support trajectory and volumetric based retrievals from 
the 4D Weather Data Cube and its Single Authoritative Source (SAS). Weather Request 
enables user defined requests (i.e., querying) for weather information (e.g., weather along flight 
path) tailored to the operational need. Users obtain the specific information they require, rather 
than being provided volumes of information from which they need to locate and interpret the 
information they require. Weather Request also enables the Weather Translation function. 
 
EN-2700 Weather Information Regulatory Structure 
 
This new weather regulatory structure is necessary to accommodate NextGen weather 
capabilities and technological advancements. It will identify regulations and guidance material 
(Advisory Circulars, etc.) that may require revision to support the use of the NextGen 4D 
Weather SAS. It will address numerous policy issues such as: How will weather information 
from the network-enabled 4D Weather Data Cube address today's regulatory requirements? 
How will information in the 4D Weather Data Cube be certified for use? 
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EN-1234 NextGen Enterprise Network – DOC 
 
Within the Department of Commerce (DOC) enterprise, NextGen information is managed 
and shared using a service-oriented enterprise network. As part of the overall NextGen 
enterprise network, this DOC-specific enterprise network provides internal services, supports 
internal users, and exchanges NextGen information with non-DOC sources. This enterprise 
network: (1) complies with NextGen minimum standards for network management and 
infrastructure/security services, (2) is deployed on a DOC physical network (links, switches, 
routers, etc.), (3) is tested and validated, and (4) is specific to DOC operational requirements 
and supports the delivery of DOC information services. As services are deployed, network 
managers must ensure that the enterprise network capacity and performance is sufficient to 
support the Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and Quality of Service (QoS) requirements 
associated with the information services. The availability date for this enabler reflects 
compliance with published NextGen standards. 
 
EN-2050 Information Sharing Standards: Weather Information 
 
The standards that allow weather data to be universally transported on a network-enabled 
infrastructure and used by a variety of automated support systems are developed and guide the 
implementation of the network-enabled capability. Weather data include the dissemination of 
consolidated observation and forecast data as well as the collection and control of sensor data. 
 
EN-2040 NextGen Net-Enabled Operations Virtual 4D Weather Data Cube Governance 
Structure 
 
A governance structure is established, based on existing governance models, to manage 
the development, authorization, standards, policy, and certification of the NextGen Net-Enabled 
Operations (NEO) Four Dimensional (4D) Weather Data Cube and to provide a Single 
Authoritative Source (SAS) of current and forecasted weather information. The governance 
structure will define: NextGen 4D Weather Data Cube content, business rules, boundaries with 
the national weather information infrastructure, the general public's level of participation, 
categories of publisher/subscribers, and roles of foreign entities. It will also provide the 
mechanism, criteria, and policy for accepting/approving subscribers/providers, and establish the 
delineation between state of the atmosphere information and translated weather constraint 
information. 
 
EN-2710 NextGen Net-Enabled Operations 4D Weather Data Cube Governance Models 
 
This is the high-level Governance Model for all of aviation weather and includes: delineating 
the boundaries of private and public sector weather information; defining inter-agency weather 
roles and responsibilities; and arbitrating inter-agency financing of NextGen weather. There are 
two weather governance systems. The first is for civil weather services, which is free and open 
to the world. The second is for aviation weather system management (i.e., 4D Weather Data 
Cube), which needs to be secure and protected. Within the aviation weather system there are 
two distinct governance groups: NEO for weather dissemination and NextGen Weather for 
weather information. Each of these governance groups will build a governance framework to 
support the network-enabled 4D Weather Data Cube, which jointly will protect weather data and 
make it available. 
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EN-2260 Integrated Network-Enabled Weather Observation System 
 
Develop an overall strategy and implementation plan to define the capabilities of an 
adaptive, integrated network of ground, air and satellite weather sensors. This includes the 
research and acquisition strategy needed to support the plan. This plan will result in the 
elimination of independent and redundant plans, strategies, and acquisitions. Integration of 
ground, airborne and satellite weather observation information in real time (includes hardware, 
software and interfaces) enables the creation of the initial single authoritative source of current 
weather information 
 
EN-2220 Network-Enabled Weather Observation System - Ground-Based 
 
Network-enabled ground-based sensor system is the initial observation sensor system, 
which includes connectivity to the net-centric environment (i.e., hardware, software and 
interfaces) and supports the collection of ground-based observations. 
 
EN-2230 Network-Enabled Weather Observation System - Airborne - Major Carriers 
 
This initial sensor system builds upon current airborne sensor systems. It supports the 
collection of observations (e.g., turbulence, icing, winds, temperature, and water vapor) from 
major passenger, regional passenger, and package carriers. The data is network enabled by 
ground systems. Other airborne observations will be used if they are available in this timeframe. 
 
EN-2240 Network-Enabled Weather Observation System – Satellites 
 
Network-enabled space-based sensor system is the near-term observation sensor system, 
which includes connectivity to the net-centric environment (i.e., hardware, software and 
interfaces) and supports the collection of space-based observations. 
 
EN-2060 Aviation Weather Information System - Network-enable Existing Systems 
 
Network-enable multi-agency legacy system functions (e.g., Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), Department of Defense (DOD)). Current point-to-point communications and unique 
processing of weather information (e.g., Weather and Radar Processor, Integrated Terminal 
Weather System ) are network-enabled to support legacy display systems. Following this 
weather processor migration, Air Traffic Management (ATM) applications, procedures, and 
operational concepts are redirected to the NextGen Net-Enabled virtual Four-Dimensional (4D) 
Weather Cube. Stakeholders benefit from reduced cost to acquire weather information, a 
common weather picture, and access to the same weather information available to all 
stakeholders. 
 
EN-2410 Weather Forecasts - Consolidated Convective Storm 
 
NextGen's initial predictive models and current weather observations are fused/blended to 
provide a consolidated convective storm diagnosis and forecast that is available to users over a 
network-enabled infrastructure. This capability will include forecasts for the Continental United 
States (CONUS) 0-4 hour timeframe. 
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EN-2420 Weather Forecasts - Consolidated Icing 
 
NextGen's initial predictive models and current weather observations are fused/blended to 
provide a consolidated icing diagnosis and forecast that is available to users over a Network-
Enabled Infrastructure (NEI). This capability will include forecasts for the Continental United 
States (CONUS) 0-12 hour timeframe. 
 
EN-2430 Weather Forecasts - Consolidated Turbulence 
 
NextGen's initial predictive models and current weather observations are fused/blended to 
provide a consolidated turbulence diagnosis and forecast that is available to users over a 
network-enabled infrastructure. This capability will include North America from 10,000 feet to 
FL450, 0-18 hours, updated hourly, and will forecast clear air and mountain wave turbulence. 
 
EN-2440 Weather Forecasts - Consolidated Ceiling and Visibility 
 
NextGen's initial predictive models and current weather observations are fused/blended to 
provide a consolidated ceiling and visibility diagnosis and forecast that is available to users over 
a network-enabled infrastructure. This capability will include 1) Continental United States 
(CONUS) 0-12 hours, updated hourly (diagnosis every 5 minutes) and 2) a high-resolution 
product around selected terminal areas. 
 
EN-2520 Weather Forecasts - Consolidated Winter Storm 
 
NextGen's initial predictive models and current weather observations are fused/blended to 
provide a consolidated winter storm diagnosis and forecast that is available to users over a 
Network-Enabled Infrastructure (NEI). This capability will include forecasts for the Continental 
United States (CONUS) 0-4 hour timeframe. 
B.2. Development Activities 
 
D-0520 Airport Information Architecture 
 
Development of best practices and planning architectures for multiparty (including public and 
community involvement) airport development actions, supporting implementation by airport 
operators and communities. 
 
D-1200 Guidance for Trajectory-Based Procedures 
 
Development of trajectory-based procedures to support a national policy decision on 
liabilities related to the shift in separation responsibility from air traffic service providers to flight 
operators as well as from humans to automation. 
 
D-0830 Trajectory Negotiation Protocols for Air and Ground Information Architectures 
 
Development of trajectory negotiation protocols, including appropriate authorization/hand 
shake definitions to secure aircraft/ground ops exchange of information, supporting aircraft and 
ground information architectures. 
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D-2135 Air and Ground Separation Management Architecture 
 
Development of air/ground separation management architectures that can satisfy NextGen's 
increased capacity and safety requirements. 
 
D-0260 Development of NextGen Interagency NCI Requirements 
 
Development of NextGen interagency Net-Centric Infrastructure (NCI) requirements, 
including but not limited to: infrastructure equipment and platforms (in generic terms), 
information sharing strategies, exchange protocols, and metadata standards. This focuses on 
high-level requirements for the low-level network; it does not include security and information 
services addressed in more detail by other development items. 
 
D-1070 Development of NextGen Interagency Net-Centric Security Requirements 
 
Development of information security plans and guidelines to support information sharing 
among NextGen Partners that include security policies, protocols, performance measure 
criteria, assessment evaluation procedures, as well as certification, verification and validation 
methodologies of authorized users and providers of secured and non-secured information. This 
is important to support agency policy decisions about sharing information. 
 
D-2194 Net Enabled Operations Prototype Development/Evaluation 
 
Development of the Net-Enabled Operations (NEO) Spiral 1 joint project is a prototype 
development/evaluation effort which connects and builds outward from legacy air traffic and air 
security systems. NEO spiral 1 will be conducted in four 90 day engineering activities intended 
to determine how a NextGen NEO system should perform. This is an operational risk reduction 
measures that will develop expanded interagency collaboration tools and lead to future targeted 
implementations of NextGen NEO capabilities. 
 
D-0260 Development of NextGen Interagency NCI Requirements 
 
Development of NextGen interagency Net-Centric Infrastructure (NCI) requirements, 
including but not limited to: infrastructure equipment and platforms (in generic terms), 
information sharing strategies, exchange protocols, and metadata standards. This focuses on 
high-level requirements for the low-level network; it does not include security and information 
services addressed in more detail by other development items. 
 
D-1070 Development of NextGen Interagency Net-Centric Security Requirements 
 
Development of information security plans and guidelines to support information sharing 
among NextGen Partners that include security policies, protocols, performance measure 
criteria, assessment evaluation procedures, as well as certification, verification and validation 
methodologies of authorized users and providers of secured and non-secured information. This 
is important to support agency policy decisions about sharing information. 
 
D-1220 Development of Weather Hazard Severity Indices 
 
Development of severity indices for turbulence, convection, icing, and other aviation weather 
hazards. These indices will help identify the impacts of weather on specific aircraft types and 
configurations that will be crucial during collaborative decision-making. 
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D-2113 Operating Procedures for Human Forecasters using Automated Systems 
 
Development of operating procedures outlining the role of human forecasters augmenting 
automatically generated Four-Dimensional (4D) weather grids. 
 
D-0480 Reduced Oceanic Separation Standards and Procedures 
 
Development of non-radar 30 mile lateral separation standards and procedures for use in 
Oceanic airspace. 
 
D-0490 5nm Non-Radar Separation Standards and Procedures 
 
Development of 5 mile non-radar longitudinal separation standards and procedures. 
 
D-0920 Advanced Scheduling Decision Support Tool Enhancements 
 
Development of en route and advanced terminal scheduling tool requirements, in the form of 
Traffic Management Advisor (TMA) improvements, along with site adaptations and operational 
use procedures. This includes research to generate time-based schedules for aircraft executing 
NextGen arrival procedures. 
 
D-2127  3D RNAV/RNP Procedures 
 
Development of initial Three Dimensional (3D) Area Navigation/Required Navigation 
Performance (RNAV/RNP) procedures for aircraft operator implementation. 
 
D-2117 Network-Enabled Weather Data Standards 
 
Development of a virtual, authoritative, net-centric Four Dimensional (4D) weather 
information system that provides information tailored to Air Traffic Management (ATM) 
procedures, including routine (diagnostics and forecasts) and real-time hazardous weather 
information to support an implementation decision on the network-enabled 4D Weather Cube. 
 
 
D-2179 Enhanced Ground-Based Weather Sensors 
 
Development of NextGen ground-based sensors that will be installed/modified at specified 
airports and other locations to provide weather and environmental observations. 
 
D-2191 Enhanced Airborne-Based Weather Sensors 
 
Development of NextGen airborne sensors that is installed/modified on aircraft and 
unmanned aerial systems to provide weather and environmental observations. 
 
D-0840  Weather Forecast Assessment Verification System 
 
Development of a real-time verification system that quantitatively assesses the accuracy, 
reliability, quality, and timeliness of weather forecasts (e.g., probabilistic information) to support 
collaborative Air Traffic Management (ATM) decision-making for trajectory-based and flexible 
terminal operations. 
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D-0850 Network-Enabled Weather Information System 
 
Development of a virtual, authoritative, net-centric four-dimensional weather information 
system that provides information tailored to Air Traffic Management (ATM) procedures, 
including routine (diagnostics and forecasts) and real-time, hazardous weather information. 
B.3. Research Activities 
R-1190 Applied Research on Certification Methods, Requirements, and Standards for 
UASs 
 
Applied research on safety certifications for control systems, sense and avoid capabilities, 
collision avoidance capabilities, and emergency procedures as they apply to Unmanned Aerial 
Systems (UAS). 
 
R-1370 Applied Research on the Operational Concept for UASs in Trajectory-Based 
Airspace 
 
Applied research on Unmanned Aircraft System's (UAS) operational and air-ground systems 
integration into trajectory-based airspaces to support alternative selection and regulation 
decisions on UAS access and transparency requirements. 
 
R-1230 Applied Research on Weather and Wake Impacts for En Route Operations 
 
Applied research to incorporate weather and wake impacts into reduced en route separation 
standards and overall en route operational procedures. 
 
R-0600 Applied Research on Assessing and Predicting Wake Severity 
 
Applied research to assess and predict the severity of aircraft wake encounters based on 
aircraft parameters and wake encounter geometry. 
 
R-2126 Applied Research on Airframe Designs to Accelerate Wake Vortex Decay 
 
Applied research on airframe design technologies that accelerate wake vortex decay. 
 
R-2114 Applied Research on Improved Weather Sensing and Forecasting Models 
 
Applied research on improved models for weather sensing and forecasting relevant to 
NextGen decision-making during convective and winter weather, turbulence, icing, clouds, 
visibility, volcanic ash dispersion, space weather, environmental factors (noise, emissions and 
hazardous release dispersion, upper atmospheric climate effects), and wake vortices 
 
R-1620 Applied Research on Aircraft-Based CNS Technologies in Self-Separation 
Airspace 
 
Applied research on initial traffic spacing management alternatives in congested en route 
airspace to support an alternative selection on Trajectory Management, merging, spacing and 
metering.  
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R-1460 Applied Research on Common Surface Automation Platform 
 
Applied research for a common surface automation platform, networking and display 
systems to support cost-effective automated and integrated arrival/departure decision support 
systems and information technology infrastructure in the tower environment. 
 
R-1060 Applied Research on NextGen Team Size Optimization 
 
Applied research to understand NextGen optimal team sizes and skill set compositions to 
support staff management and facility design. 
 
R-2112 Applied Research on Weather Integration into NextGen Decision Making 
 
Applied research on the most effective methodologies, algorithms, and tools for the 
integration of weather information into NextGen decision-making such as: translation of 
weather's impact on operations, operational metrics development, determination of NextGen 
relevant weather information, basic mathematical research into optimization methodologies, 
operational research analysis, techniques for the presentation of probabilistic information to 
humans and automation, characterization of hazardous weather phenomena (e.g., estimation of 
aircraft-specific weather hazard levels, pilot likelihood to deviate, permeability of weather), and 
benefits pool estimation 
 
R-0370 Applied Research on Advanced Scheduling Concepts in Congested Terminal 
Airspace 
 
Applied research on traffic spacing management for transition, arrival, and departure 
operations supporting high-throughput delivery of aircraft to the runway threshold and high-
throughput departure operations, including capacity benefits and potential increased 
arrival/departure rates. 
B.4. Policy Issues 
PI-0006 Balance of Human vs. Automation 
 
Policies should be explored to determine the balance and trade-offs between automation 
and human participation in traffic management. Improper functional allocation between 
automation and human can decrease efficiency, effectiveness, and safety. Decisions related to 
this allocation should consider the adequate level of human involvement that will be required 
and the level of reliance on automation that will be acceptable to the flying public. 
 
PI-0115 NextGen Safety Assessment/Certification - Synchronization of Aircraft and 
ANS Capabilities 
 
The aircraft and Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) systems envisioned for NextGen 
are technically innovative, highly sophisticated, and interdependent. Many NextGen 
improvements require the synchronized implementation of these interdependent and integrated 
yet separate aircraft and ANSP systems. To support the most efficient implementation of these 
improvements yet address all safety issues, NextGen operational improvements should be 
assessed as integrated capabilities. A system safety approach should be used that considers 
elements such as procedures, backup capabilities and the interrelationships of all systems used 
to accomplish the operational improvement. Rather than separate assessments and certification 
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of individual systems, the safety assessment and certification process will include an approach 
incorporating the integrated use of aircraft and ANSP systems. 
 
PI-0116 NextGen Safety Assessment/Certification - Standards and Tools 
 
The systems envisioned for NextGen will be technically innovative and highly sophisticated, 
permitting aircraft to operate in new and more flexible ways, and resulting in changing roles for 
operators. New safety assessment standards, methodologies, and verification and validation 
tools must be developed for application to NextGen capabilities and requirements that cannot 
be adequately assessed through existing processes. Techniques and technologies to identify 
emergent risks must be developed. 
 
PI-0110 International Commercial Space Operations 
 
Policy mechanisms need to be developed to ensure that U.S. commercial space operations 
are allowed to depart from U.S. spaceports and land in spaceports located in foreign countries. 
These policies should ensure that launches originating in foreign countries and destined for the 
U.S. do not pose public safety or national security risks. 
 
PI-0022 GPS Policy to Support Civil NextGen PNT Requirements 
 
A great deal of reliance is being placed on the Global Positioning System (GPS) for 
NextGen Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) services for Communications, Navigation, 
and Surveillance (CNS). The GPS system may not meet civil requirements. Current Department 
of Defense (DOD) minimum GPS performance guarantees do not provide sufficient 
performance to meet civil requirements, without augmentation. Despite actual, demonstrated 
performance that exceeds the current commitment; civil reliance on the system can only rely on 
the U.S. Government commitment specified in the GPS standard performance service 
specification. Policies should be reviewed to ensure that GPS performance guarantees support 
requirements in a cost-effective manner for both service provider and user. Reliance on foreign 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) should be considered as part of this review (see PI-
0075). 
 
PI-0024 Secure Information Exchange 
 
1) Develop policies to define (an) organization(s) that will maintain ownership of aviation 
information. 2) Develop policies to address handling current and archived data to protect privacy 
and proprietary information; establish mechanisms for protecting competitive information; create 
an oversight body with jurisdiction and responsibility over stakeholder data; and delegate 
certification responsibility. 3) Develop streamlined U.S. and international regulatory/policy 
coordination, through International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and/or other 
bilateral/multilateral partnerships, related to secure information exchange of aviation related 
information, including access rules and governance. Secure exchange of information includes 
access controls, trust relationships, associated policies and mechanisms to provide appropriate 
access to information by authenticated users. Information content may be impacted by legal 
ramifications, proprietary preference, and civil liberties concerns and policies. Top Secret, 
Secret, Controlled but Unclassified, and industry proprietary information must remain protected 
in the net-centric NextGen. Cross-domain (e.g., Multi-Level Security Exchange/Gateway 
Capability) secure communication is a critical feature of data availability. The policy domains 
constituting NextGen include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following: FAA, Department 
of Defense (DOD), Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department 
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of Homeland Security (DHS), National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA); state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement and emergency responders; airline operating companies; 
General Aviation (GA) facilities; commercial air traffic communication providers; foreign civil 
aviation authorities and ICAO. 
 
PI-0120 PNT Performance Requirements 
 
Develop policy to determine which backup Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) services 
constitutes "critical" aviation infrastructure applications according to Presidential directive. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7 states: "In accordance with U.S. Space-
Based [PNT] Policy, the Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, will develop, acquire, operate, and maintain backup [PNT] capabilities that 
can support critical transportation, homeland security, and other critical civil and commercial 
infrastructure applications within the U.S., in the event of a disruption of the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) or other space-based PNT services...." Moreover, develop streamlined U.S. and 
international regulatory/policy coordination, through the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) and/or other bilateral/multilateral partnerships, in order to manage standardization 
and/or compatibility changes in PNT performance requirements. This is meant to address 
domestic and foreign aircraft within U.S. airspace and across international airspace boundaries. 
(e.g., Performance requirements for Required Navigation Performance [RNP] 0.1 should be 
consistent among states and operational approval in one state should be accepted by other 
states; the same should be true for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast [ADS-B] 
performance requirements.) 
 
PI-0009 National Integrated Surveillance Plan 
 
Policies are needed to define the security levels, criteria and approval processes that will 
guide the sharing of complementary cooperative and non-cooperative surveillance data among 
public and private entities. These should address content attributes such as accuracy, 
timeliness, identification and authorization. At a minimum, Department of Defense (DOD), 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Transportation / Federal Aviation 
Administration (DOT/FAA) and operators must collaborate on policies regarding the collection 
and distribution of surveillance data and requirements for data security, network security and 
access requirements. Associated policies must then be developed to ensure that each user is 
able to access complete, accurate and timely surveillance information to satisfy their operational 
requirements. 
 
PI-0110 International Commercial Space Operations 
 
Policy mechanisms need to be developed to ensure that U.S. commercial space operations 
are allowed to depart from U.S. spaceports and land in spaceports located in foreign countries. 
These policies should ensure that launches originating in foreign countries and destined for the 
U.S. do not pose public safety or national security risks. 
 
PI-0087 Weather Information Policy - Use of Single Authoritative Source in ATM 
Decisions 
 
A policy should be established to ensure that the NextGen Four-Dimensional (4D) Weather 
Cube Single Authoritative Source (SAS) is the required source of weather information for pilot 
and air traffic management (ATM) decisions. Additionally, such policy must ensure that weather 
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information in the Cube is equally and readily available to all airspace participants under open 
and unrestricted data rights. 
 
PI-0089 Weather Avoidance Decision Making Responsibilities 
 
1) In an environment where weather information is more readily available to the pilot in the 
air via net-centric communications and/or Flight Information Service-Broadcast (FIS-B) what is 
the requirement and the nature of controller dispensed weather advisories? Providing additional 
weather products does not make the controller more effective in providing weather advisories 
without enhanced translation. When these can be translated automatically into traffic/trajectory 
impacts should the user subscribe to an advisory service or should the controller retain that 
voice requirement. What is the concept of advisory services in a digital environment? 2) In the 
future of digital communications, the Airport Operations Center (AOC), Pilot, controller and 
Traffic Management Unit (TMU) can be actively linked in weather related flow and trajectory 
reroutes. How will digital communications change the manner in which these objectives are 
accomplished now that all actors can be linked into the data conversation versus the voice only 
limitations on their current interactions? The responsibilities are the same, but limitations on 
executing the responsibilities real-time have been relieved. 
 
PI-0086 Weather Information Policy - Global Harmonization 
 
Develop streamlined U.S. and international standards and guidelines, through International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other international aviation, meteorological governing 
bodies, and bilateral/multilateral mechanisms regarding standards for weather information 
provided by all states. Weather information in the form of meteorological variables that are 
observed or forecasted (e.g., storm intensity, echo tops, etc.) must be translated into information 
that is directly relevant to NextGen users and service providers, such as the likelihood of a flight 
deviation, airspace permeability, and capacity. Global coordination is needed to establish 
common standards for weather information provided by all nations. 
 
PI-0088 Federal vs. Private Role In Weather Services 
 
NextGen envisions a single, authoritative source for aviation weather and a common 
weather picture for all air transportation users. Eventually this picture would be incorporated into 
decision support tools available to automation, controllers and pilots. Policy should be 
developed to determine the roles and responsibilities of government, private, and academic 
participants in the nation's weather enterprise to take full advantage of their capabilities to meet 
NextGen weather requirements. 
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Appendix C – Relationship among OI-0349 and Its Supporting Elements 
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Appendix D – Simple and Complex Versions of an OI-0349 Scenario 
D.1. Simple Version of the Scenario 
 
This simple version of the scenario features departures from two different runways at a 
single airport with common Standard Instrument Departures being conducted from a merge 
point. Instead of the conventional approach in which the tower controller might regulate the 
takeoff spacing to try to assure longitudinal separation at the merge point without excessive use 
of tactical instructions by the approach controller after the aircraft take off, airborne surveillance 
in the form of flight deck based interval management for spacing (FIM-S) is used to allow the 
flight crew of the trailing aircraft to regulate speed and potentially takeoff interval to achieve the 
designated spacing interval by the time the lead aircraft reaches the merge point and then 
maintain that spacing until a termination point on the common route. BA123 has already 
received a departure clearance indicating use of runway 090R and then via FACTS and BTG to 
the BOILS departure. 
 
While the aircraft are still taxiing to their respective runways, clearance delivery sends an 
FIM-S instruction to BA123 using CPDLC. The instruction clears BA123 to achieve and maintain 
90 seconds spacing on BA789 who will depart on 09L via BLAKO and YKM to the BOILS 
departure (see Figure D1). The spacing is to be achieved by BOI and then maintained until 
SLC. The crew of BA123 loads the data into the FIM-S system and accepts the clearance. The 
crew of BA123 has intermittent contact with BA789 on the surface map traffic display during the 
taxi, and a solid contact as both aircraft reach the runway end. The FIM-S system monitors 
BA789 observing that data quality requirements for conducting FIM-S are met and, based on 
wind and temperature forecasts, assumptions about BA789’s climb performance and speed, 
and the relative lengths of the two aircraft’s departure paths between their respective runways 
and BOI, estimates that BA123 must take off 38 seconds after BA789. This initial interval would 
allow BA123 to fly its planned climb profile and speed schedule with no need to adjust. 
However, the crew understands that a number of factors can change the speed requirements. 
 
BA123 is cleared for takeoff position on runway 09R as BA789 applies thrust for takeoff on 
runway 09L. The tower controller gives BA123 a 45 second runway hold window to allow for 
adjustment for the FIM-S procedure, and BA123 is able to apply thrust within a few seconds of 
the ideal predicted interval. No FIM-S speed guidance is presented to the flight crew during the 
takeoff phase; only when the aircraft reaches thrust reduction altitude does the FIM-S system 
regain its active state and present speed guidance. 
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Figure D1. Simple Version of the Scenario (A) 
 
Once the FIM-S system becomes active and speed guidance is provided, the crew responds 
to the guidance and informs the approach controller. While the aircraft remains below 10,000 
feet msl, speed guidance is restricted to 250 KCAS or to the minimum speed for the aircraft 
model at high weight. By this time, BA789 has passed through 14,000 feet and has been 
handed off to Center. BA123 passes through 10,000 feet as it sequences BTG, and the 
displayed speed guidance increases to 327 kt. The guidance is fed to the aircraft’s automation, 
and the pitch attitude of the aircraft changes to expedite the acceleration while still maintaining a 
rate of climb of more than 500 ft/min (see Figure D2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D2. Simple Version of the Scenario (B) 
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From this point on, the FIM-S equipment continues to provide speed guidance to the flight 
crew of BA123 and to the aircraft’s automation. The flight crew monitors the changes in speed 
guidance for acceptability and also for the continuing feasibility of achieving the cleared spacing 
value by the time the aircraft arrives at BOI. The crew also ensures that no failures are affecting 
the FIM-S operation. The arrivals controller monitors the operation to ensure that separation 
issues do not arise despite the fact that the lead aircraft has departed the sector. On reaching 
approximately 14,000 feet, the flight crew of BA123 switches frequency to Center and informs 
the controller that the FIM-S operation is ongoing. The Center controller assumes the task of 
monitoring the operation to assure separation. 
 
When BA789 reaches BOI, the BA123 has 88 seconds to run before reaching BOI, and it is 
almost 9 NM behind BA789 and that distance is increasing (see Figure D3). The first FIM-S 
goal, that of achieving the assigned interval within tolerances by the achieve-by point (BOI), has 
been accomplished. The FIM-S system enters the ‘maintain’ mode. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D3. Simple Version of the Scenario (C) 
 
In the maintain mode, the FIM-S system continues to provide speed guidance to the flight 
crew of BA123 and to the aircraft’s automation. Minor changes in speed result from correction of 
the small spacing error apparent at the achieve-by point (BOI) and from inaccuracies in wind 
and atmospheric temperature forecasts compared with the values experienced. As the aircraft 
levels at its assigned cruise altitude, control of speed reverts from use of pitch attitude to 
modulation of engine thrust.  
 
As BA789 passes SLC with BA123 90.3 seconds behind, the FIM-S system in BA123 
terminates the operation. The flight crew of BA123 informs the Center controller of the 
termination and advises that current speed is 0.826M. The controller clears the crew for use of 
normal cruise speed and conventional (non-FIM-S) operations resume. 
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D.2. Complex Version of the Scenario 
A more complex and potentially more realistic version of the scenario would see streams of 
aircraft departing from three runways to form a single stream starting at BOI. There would also 
be an intermediate merge point at BTG for two of the runway departure streams. In addition, 
some of the aircraft to be considered would be equipped with neither ADS-B IN (so no FIM-S 
capability) nor functional ADS-B Out but meeting the terms of the Minimum Equipment List for 
the flight (so it cannot be a target for FIM-S). Such a scenario would introduce additional 
complexity to the operations and allow consideration of additional enablers in the ATM domain. 
 
Coordination of takeoffs from the three runways would have to take into account the 
following: 
 
• Taxi route length, complexity, and intersections/merges with other taxi streams 
• The need to deliver aircraft to the right runway ends in the right order at appropriate 
times  
• Provision of takeoff clearances at times consistent with the different path lengths to the 
merge points including allocation of time-based takeoff ‘brackets’ that allow the crew to 
respond to the FIM-S system’s guidance on departure intervals 
• Aircraft performance characteristics including plans for takeoff and climb thrust derates 
extracted from the flight plan.  
 
To satisfy all requirements, the ground and tower controllers utilize an airport surface traffic 
management tool and good communication between controllers, perhaps through some 
combination of voice and data communication. This tool would also coordinate/be integrated 
with the integrated arrival/departure manager. 
 
Since each aircraft in the stream (assuming all are FIM-S-equipped) is instructed to achieve 
the assigned spacing goal by BOI, minor differences in lift-off time and differences in aircraft 
climb performance compared with those assumed might result in traffic conflicts during the 
merge at BTG. In order to assure separation at BTG, the departure manager function (part 
human and part decision support tool) would need to be integrated in its operation with the 
airport surface traffic management tool and strong coordination would be necessary between 
tower and approach (departure) controller. Figure D4 illustrates the traffic stream. All aircraft are 
depicted as FIM-S-equipped and each has been assigned an interval of 90 seconds from the 
preceding aircraft. All aircraft between BOI and SLC have already achieved the assigned 
spacing and are maintaining that spacing value. Aircraft between YKM and BOI and between 
BTG and BOI have been assigned the spacing, but variations in spacing occasioned by takeoff 
time variance and by the need to provide separation between merging streams at BTG has 
resulted in a need to adjust the interval to achieve the assigned value. As is apparent from the 
diagram, an aircraft’s preceding aircraft at BOI is likely to have taken off from a different runway. 
 
Although not the case in the illustration above, not all aircraft in the stream may be equipped 
to conduct FIM-S operations; some of them may not even have ADS-B Out functionality of 
sufficient quality to support FIM-S as targets. In such a case, to maximize use of FIM-S by not 
starting a new string of FIM-S operations each time there is an unequipped aircraft in the 
stream, the controller can instruct a FIM-S-equipped aircraft to space on an aircraft two or three 
ahead in the final, single stream. Assuming that the target aircraft remains within ADS-B range, 
this operation is no different for the crew of the FIM-S aircraft than the simple operation 
described above. However, the controller must now keep the unequipped aircraft close to the 
center of the gap between the FIM-S target aircraft ahead and the FIM-S aircraft behind, and do 
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so as these two aircraft adjust speed to meet their spacing assignments (the target aircraft may 
be a FIM-S aircraft spacing on another aircraft ahead). In order to reduce controller workload, 
ATM ground system automation would need to provide speed guidance for the unequipped 
aircraft (part of a future GIM-S function). Since aircraft cross into Center airspace during the 
operation, coordination between the airport approach controller and the Center controller must 
ensure that the nature of the overall operation (FIM-S with mixed equipage and some aircraft 
requiring speed guidance) is understood at handoff. If the controller fails to provide speed 
instructions that keep the aircraft adequately spaced, the aircraft ahead of or behind the 
unequipped aircraft might experience a TCAS Resolution Advisory which would introduce a 
significant perturbation into the flow. It is clear, therefore, that the controller must understand 
when an RA might be triggered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure D4. Complex Version of the Scenario   
 
If wind and temperature data predictions are sufficiently inaccurate (e.g., position of a frontal 
zone is not as predicted), FIM-S aircraft will adjust speed more frequently and perhaps by 
greater amounts than would otherwise be the case, increasing flight crew workload to a degree. 
Such variations might create string instability with spacing varying in an oscillatory manner and 
more significantly the further back down the string of aircraft. If control of unequipped aircraft is 
also included, use of different weather predictions, of different support tool algorithms than in 
the aircraft, and of different control loop lengths, controller-to-pilot vs. FIM-S system-to-pilot 
might result in larger and/or more aggressive speed changes that might add to the instability. 
The FIM-S algorithm may limit the size and rate of speed changes to contain such instability 
while the controller might minimize the number (but in doing so increase the size) of speed 
changes to contain workload. 
 
Any disturbance to the flow might trigger similar effects. Examples might include: the need to 
instruct an aircraft toward the head of the stream to fly level for conflict resolution would result in 
similar needs for trailing aircraft and differences in observed target groundspeeds compared 
with predictions; speed instructions for conflict resolution to a target aircraft perhaps following 
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handoff to Center and owing to poor coordination; a target aircraft reducing speed to turbulence 
penetration speed when it encounters convective weather.   
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